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ABSTRACT 
 
 Postwar suburban sprawl resulted in environmental consequences that engendered 
a backlash from those concerned about the quality life in the places they lived, played, 
and worked. Few cities grew as rapidly as Phoenix and therefore the city offers an 
important case study to evaluate the success and limits of environmentalism in shaping 
urban growth in the postwar period. 
 Using three episodes looking at sanitation and public health, open space 
preservation, and urban transportation, I argue three factors played a critical role in 
determining the extent to which environmental values were incorporated into Phoenix’s 
urban growth policy. First, the degree to which environmental values influenced urban 
policy depends on the degree to which they fit into the Southwestern suburban lifestyle. 
A desire for low-density development and quality of life amenities like outdoor recreation 
resulted in decisions to extend municipal sewers further into the desert, the creation of a 
mountain preserve system, and freeways as the primary mode of travel in the city. 
Second, federal policy and the availability of funds guided policies pursued by Phoenix 
officials to deal with the unintended environmental impacts of growth. For example, 
federal dollars provided one-third of the funds for the construction of a centralized 
sewage treatment plant, half the funds to save Camelback Mountain and ninety percent of 
the construction costs for the West Papago-Inner Loop. Lastly, policy alternatives needed 
broad and diverse public support, as the public played a critical role, through bond 
approvals and votes, as well as grassroots campaigning, in integrating environmental 
values into urban growth policy. Public advocacy campaigns---led by civic groups, 
ii 
 
government officials, and especially newspapers---played an important role in setting the 
policy agenda and framing the policy issues that shaped policy alternatives and the 
public’s receptivity to those choices. 
 Urban policy decisions are part of a dynamic and ongoing process, where 
previous decisions result in new challenges that provide an opportunity for debate, and 
the incorporation of new social values into the decision-making process. While twenty-
first century challenges require responses that reflect contemporary macroeconomic 
factors and social values, the postwar period demonstrates the need for inclusive, 
collaborative, and anticipatory decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 1: “The Arizona Good Life:” Phoenix’s Environment and Creating a Desert 
Metropolis  
 
 Following World War II, urban growth rapidly occurred on the fringe of cities. 
Between 1945 and 1980, 18 of the 25 largest cities in the nation lost population; in 1980, 
40% of Americans lived in the suburbs.
1
 Federal policies that subsidized the construction 
of single-family housing and highways, as well as defense-related spending fueled this 
growth, which resulted in a backlash from those concerned about the environmental 
consequences of suburban development. Americans had long advocated for pollution 
abatement, conservation of natural resources, and preservation of wilderness areas. The 
postwar environmental movement expressed similar quality of life concerns, but aimed 
its critiques, influenced by middle-class suburban values, at the environmental costs of 
suburban sprawl. The new struggle had roots in earlier conservation goals and rhetoric 
about protecting nature, most visible in the open spaces movement of the 1950s and 
1960s, as well as the City Beautiful Movement, and concern over industrial smoke-
abatement campaigns during the Progressive Era. It manifested most emphatically in 
suburban areas, where the countryside and city entangled. “The fight to preserve the 
spectacles of nature---the majestic rivers, the remote mountains, the wild canyons---is 
100 years old,” journalist Ben Bagdikian explained in his seminal 1966 article criticizing 
suburban sprawl, “The Rape of the Land,” but “the struggle to save the modest beauty of 
men’s own backyards is new and promising.”2 In 1965, the Johnson Administration held 
                                                          
1
 Statistics from Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 283 and 4. 
2
 Ben Bagdikian, “The Rape of the Land,” Saturday Evening Post 18 June 1966, 26. 
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A Conference on Natural Beauty that acknowledged the widespread public clamor 
against the unintended consequences of sprawl and for the protection of open spaces. 
Organizer Laurence Rockefeller explained the agenda of the conference was “new 
conservation” centered where “most people live and work---our cities and suburbs.”3 
 Historian Kenneth T. Jackson traced the origins of suburbanization to the late 19
th
 
century as well-to-do city dwellers sought to escape the negative aspects of cities, like 
overcrowding, pollution, and crime, for a home with more space closer to nature, 
separated from poor conditions in inner city slums and the minorities who lived there.
4
 In 
1966, for the first time in American history, suburban dwellers outnumbered center city 
residents. The environmentalists of the 1960s and 1970s were predominantly but not 
exclusively white, middle class, suburbanites. They included housewives, hippies, college 
students, business leaders, public officials, and others, expressing concern about human 
impact on the environment. Most commonly, they expressed concern over the places they 
knew best, as urban areas encroached into the natural environment at the fringe of cities. 
Postwar environmental movements focused on the “environment,” rather than “nature” 
because it more accurately described their experiences with the natural world in the 
suburbs. The “environment” became an umbrella term that included things not often 
                                                          
3
 See Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in 
Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2012), 252. For the Rockefeller 
quote see Beauty for America: Proceedings of the White House Conference on Natural Beauty, Washington 
D.C. May 24-25, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), 687. 
4
 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, chapters 2 and 3 discuss the appealing aspects of the suburbs, while 
chapters 11 and 12 analyze the racial and class aspects of suburbanization.  
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considered natural but endemic to cities, like sewers and streets, and therefore urban 
growth policies became an important aspect of environmentalism.
5
   
 The postwar environmental movement emerged within the socio-economic 
context of the period. Generally, four factors help to explain the postwar environmental 
movement: unprecedented affluence, mass protests over a variety of social issues, 
technological innovation that provided many societal benefits but also threatened the 
environment, and the emergence of ecology as a popularized science that provided new 
insights into the consequences of transforming nature. Middle-class women, as well as 
high school and college students played an important role in the movement as activists. 
Often they collaborated with “experts” from academia to build credibility for their 
causes, combining local knowledge with more esoteric technical knowledge to challenge 
the assumptions behind unimpeded growth.
6
 
 In part, the environmental movement stemmed from the shift from what historian 
and Democratic Party adviser Arthur Schlesinger called the “quantitative liberalism” of 
the New Deal to “qualitative liberalism” of the 1960s.7 Moreover, historian Samuel Hays 
argued that postwar concerns about the quality of life issues, like the health of the 
environment, largely emanated from the suburbs, where a wide array of issues----like 
                                                          
5
 For population statistics see, Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible, 247. 
6
 See Adam Rome, “Give Earth a Chance: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” The Journal of 
American History 90, no. 2 (September 2003), 525-554. In this article, Rome contextualizes the emergence 
of the postwar environmental movement by tracing it to three developments in the 1960s: the revitalization 
of liberalism, the growing discontent of middle-class women, and the explosion of student radicalism and 
countercultural protest. He makes the same argument in the first chapter of The Genius of Earth Day: How 
a 1970 Teach-in Unexpectedly Made the First Green Generation (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013). 
7
 See Rome, “Give Earth a Chance,” 528. The full quote is as follows: “Schlesinger put the point 
succinctly: ‘Instead of the quantitative liberalism of the 1930s, rightly dedicated to the struggle to secure 
the economic basis of life, we need now a ‘qualitative liberalism’ dedicated to bettering the quality of 
people’s lives and opportunities.’” 
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clean water and air, maintenance of sanitary conditions, and the aesthetic and recreational 
value of natural spaces---converged and coalesced. Quality of life concerns emerged not 
only in response to urban growth, but also shaped it, as municipal officials and the public 
sought to define exactly what those values meant and the extent of their influence in 
urban growth policies. The rise of government planning that began during the Progressive 
Era and continued through the postwar period presented an opportunity to obtain a better 
recognition and implementation of environmental values after the war. In The Quiet 
Crisis, a 1963 call to action, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall argued America faced 
a crisis and that policymakers needed to take decisive action “to assert the people’s right 
to clean air and water, open space, to well-designed urban areas, to mental and physical 
health.”8  
 While these debates occurred nationwide, Hays argued that “the expression of 
environmental interests usually focused on a specific place where people lived, worked, 
and carried on their leisure-time activities. Values were shaped by, and expressed within 
the environmental quality of that place.”9 In the postwar period, increasing numbers of 
people lived in the suburbs, especially in sprawling cities like Phoenix and the dynamics 
                                                          
8
 For more on the role of middle class, suburban values in shaping postwar environmentalism, see Samuel 
Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Also, see Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 46, 81, and 87-
98. Adam Rome argues for the importance of suburbanization to the environmental movement following 
World War II in Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American 
Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press). For a discussion of decision-making and urban 
growth in Phoenix, see Grady Gammage Jr., Phoenix in Perspective: Reflections on Developing the Desert. 
(Tempe: Herberger Center for Design, 1999). Chapters five through twelve are particularly relevant to 
postwar growth and suburban sprawl. I disagree with sociologist Robert Wood, who argued that 
suburbanites did not care about city politics in his classic on the suburbs, Suburbia: Its People and Their 
Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958 For Udall quote see, Stewart Udall, The Quiet Crisis (New York: 
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1963), 159-60. 
9
 For Hays quote, see Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence, 432. 
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of suburban living---its culture, natural setting, and politics---influenced the way in which 
people expressed concern about the environment. Federal policies boosted both suburban 
development and local activism that sought to mitigate the unintended consequences of 
sprawl. Historian Hal Rothman argued, “Americans embrace environmentalism when it is 
convenient and inexpensive, but when it challenges the comforts to which they are 
accustomed, they ignore or avoid it.”10 Environmental values were one of a number of 
values that made the suburbs an appealing place to live, including a desire for private 
space and larger living space in homes, new technological living with electric homes and 
appliances, and the freedom of mobility provided by the use of automobiles. Government 
officials, developers, businesses, and the public weighed these values against one 
another.
11
   
 Compared to other American cities of similar size, Phoenix, the fifth largest city 
in the nation, has been the singular focus of relatively few historical examinations. Much 
of the existing scholarly work utilizes urban growth as an organizing theme. Moreover, it 
has even fewer environmental histories.
12
  While there are numerous environmental 
histories of the American Southwest, especially Los Angeles, there is relatively little 
attention to where the majority of westerners live: urban areas. Yet, few cities grew as 
                                                          
10
 For quote, see Hal Rothman, The Greening of a Nation?: Environmentalism in the United States Since 
1945 (Forth Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), xii. 
11
For a discussion of environmentalism and urban planning, see Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and 
Permanence, 378-379. 
12
 See Philip VanderMeer, Desert Visions and the Making of Phoenix, 1860-2009 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2010) and Michael Logan, Desert Cities: The Environmental History of 
Phoenix and Tucson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 2006. Also see Douglas Kupel, Fuel for 
Growth: Water and Arizona’s Urban Environment (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2006),  
Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American 
Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013and Andrew Ross, Bird on Fire: 
Lessons from the World’s Least Sustainable City (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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rapidly as Phoenix in the postwar period or in such a sprawling fashion. Therefore, 
because Phoenix’s most salient historical trend is growth, and in particular, suburban 
sprawl, the city provides an excellent case study to examine the extent to which 
environmental concern influenced urban growth policy. Lastly, rapid urban growth 
facilitated in large part by warm weather and plentiful sunshine was not unique to 
Phoenix after World War II, as other “Sun Belt” cities like Dallas, Albuquerque, Atlanta, 
and Charlotte experienced similar growth. Therefore, this thesis provides a framework 
from which other scholars can compare and contrast Sunbelt cities to each other, as well 
as the experiences of cities that followed different demographic trajectories. 
 Using three episodes looking at sanitation and public health, open space 
preservation, and urban transportation, I argue three factors played a critical role in 
determining the extent to which environmental values were incorporated into Phoenix’s 
urban growth policy. First, the degree to which environmental values influenced urban 
policy depends on the degree to they fit into the low-density Southwestern suburban 
lifestyle. A desire for low-density development and quality of life amenities like outdoor 
recreation resulted decisions to extend municipal sewers further into the desert, the 
creation of a mountain preserve system, and the construction freeways to meet 
transportation needs. Second, federal policy and the availability of funds guided polices 
pursued by Phoenix officials to deal with the unintended environmental impacts of 
growth. For example, federal dollars provided half the funds to save Camelback 
Mountain, and ninety percent construction costs of the West Papago-Inner Loop. Lastly, 
policy alternatives need broad and diverse public support, as the public played a critical 
7 
 
role, through bond approvals and votes, as well as grassroots campaigning, in integrating 
environmental values into urban growth policy. Public campaigns---led by civic groups, 
government officials, and newspapers played an important role in setting the policy 
agenda and framing the policy issues that shaped policy alternatives and the public’s 
receptivity to those choices. 
 No history of Phoenix is complete without an examination of water, but while 
most existing scholarship focuses on supply or quantity, this thesis analyzes the often-
overlooked process of ensuring water quality and sanitation.
13
 The second chapter 
examines municipal officials’ attempts to remove the pestilent threat of septic tanks 
through the extension of the municipal sewer system and the construction of the 91
st
 
Avenue Sewage Treatment Plant, a centralized metropolitan sewage treatment facility. In 
the next chapter, I analyze a grassroots open space preservation campaign in Phoenix to 
protect Camelback Mountain from private development in the late 1950s through the 
early 1970s. The fourth chapter of this thesis looks at the debate over the future of the 
city’s transportation system, in particular the West Papago-Inner Loop freeway, and 
concern over a myriad of environmental and social issues like aesthetics, air pollution, 
and community cohesion. First, though, a brief examination of the environment and other 
                                                          
13
 There is a voluminous literature on water in the west. For examples of studies on Phoenix’s water supply 
see, Douglas Kupel, Fuel for Growth; Dean Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1962); VanderMeer, Desert Visions, 143-147; Karen L. Smith, “Community Growth and 
Water Policy” ed. Wesley Johnson, Phoenix in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Community History 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) and Michael Logan, Desert Cities. The emphasis on 
supply followed a broader trend in studies on the West and water, which often feature the Central Arizona 
Project. For example see, Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity & The Growth of the 
American West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985); Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West 
and Its Disappearing Water  (New York: Penguin, 1986); and Philip K. Fradkin, A River No More: The 
Colorado River and the West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
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factors that brought people to Phoenix provides the context for which to evaluate the 
success and limits of environmentalism in shaping urban growth in postwar Phoenix.  
 
Phoenix and its Environment, 1900-1945  
 Desert and mountains surround and define the landscape of the Phoenix urban 
area.
14
 Phoenix sits in the northeastern reaches of the Sonora Desert, in the Salt River 
Valley, giving it a hot, dry climate. Heat and aridity shape the valley’s ecology, as a 
variety of cacti and desert flora spread over red and orange rocks. The rocks contrast with 
clear blue skies. Phoenicians enjoy over 330 days of sunshine a year, providing many 
opportunities for them to take advantage of any number of outdoor activities, including 
hiking, rock climbing, golf, baseball, and swimming. The Salt River, the largest tributary 
of the Gila River, winds through Scottsdale, Mesa, Tempe, and then south of downtown 
Phoenix past South Mountain; infrequent rain and a series of dams and diversions ensure 
the riverbed through the cities (with the exception of Tempe Town Lake) is usually dry, 
sparsely vegetated, and rather pathetic looking. Mountains demarcate the Valley’s 
boundaries, which from atop provide panoramic views of the Valley below. The Sierra 
Estrella Mountains mark the southwestern boundary, while the South Mountains rise 
south of the Salt River, seven miles from downtown. From the west, the White Tanks 
capture the horizon; arching northwest to northeast, the Phoenix Mountains Preserve cast 
their shadow on the furthest northern reaches of the city, while the McDowell Mountains 
                                                          
14
 In the postwar period, “urban area” and “metropolitan area” are used almost interchangeably. While 
postwar planners more often use the term metropolitan area, I use the term urban area and metropolitan 
area to include Phoenix, Tempe, Scottsdale, Glendale, and Mesa, as well as their suburbs and smaller towns 
within Maricopa County. The legal definitions of “urban area” and “metropolitan area” have undergone 
considerable changes since the 1940s. The contemporary Phoenix metropolitan area includes all of 
Maricopa and Pinal County, which is the definition I refer to in the conclusion. 
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and Superstition Mountains tower in the more distant northeast and east. This 
environment offered a set of amenities--consistently warm weather, lots of land, 
mountains, and open spaces--that provided the foundation from which Phoenicians 
envisioned and created a desert metropolis.
15
 
 In 1900, the city of Phoenix was a small farming center with a population of only 
5,544. City boosters---government officials, local businessmen, and civic groups, among 
others---envisioned transforming the desert into an agricultural Eden. “To realize this 
vision,” historian Philip VanderMeer argued, “Phoenicians worked to change the natural 
environment, to create a complementary built environment, and to develop the 
accouterments of modern American culture.” In Desert Visions, VanderMeer shows how 
three different visions, beginning with an agricultural vision, influenced the growth 
policies toward specific goals; at no point did they seriously consider slowing growth. 
Assistance first came from the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, which provided funds 
for the Bureau of Reclamation to construct Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River in 1911 to 
store water for the Salt River Project Irrigation District. Boosters, including the Santa Fe 
Railway, promised fertile soil, plentiful sunshine, and now a stable water supply to attract 
migrants to the valley. By 1930, the city’s population had grown population to 48,118. 
The invention of the air conditioner in the early 1930s made valley summers more 
hospitable, and growth continued.
16
 In the 1940s, Phoenix leaders envisioned a new kind 
of city, which relied on high-tech manufacturing industries, tourism, and housing 
                                                          
15
 Climate information can be found at Western Regional Climate Center, http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-
bin/clilcd.pl?az23183 (accessed January 23, 2014). 
16
 For air conditioning in Phoenix see, Bob Cunningham, “The Box That Broke the Barrier: The Swamp 
Cooler Comes to Southern Arizona,” Journal of Arizona History 26, No. 2 (1985), 163–74. For national 
context and federal funding for central air through the FHA, see Gail Cooper, Air Conditioning America: 
Engineers and the Controlled Environment, 1900-1960 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
10 
 
construction. To make this dream a reality required the transformation of the built 
agricultural environment into a modern postwar city.
17
 
 
Phoenix’s Postwar Vision: Selling Natural and Human Capital 
 In 1949, the city of Phoenix underwent a political transformation that shaped the 
next thirty years of the city’s history. The Phoenix Charter Government Committee 
(CGC) ran on a reform platform that emphasized managerial expertise and efficiency, 
and swept the 1949 mayoral and city council elections. The CGC consisted of business 
and civic leaders, who “embraced government power and planning in order to reconstruct 
a developmental state that would privilege industry” and make the city more attractive to 
homebuyers, tourists, and businesses. Until the late 1970s, the CGC remained the 
dominant political group in the city and its desire to turn Phoenix into a desert metropolis 
played an important role in city policy in the postwar period.
18
 
                                                          
17
 For population statistics, see Philip VanderMeer, 39. VanderMeer’s quote can be found on page 9 and a 
discussion of the city as an agricultural Eden on pages 76-78. VanderMeer describes the vision of Phoenix 
leaders during and after World War II in Chapter 4. For a discussion of the Salt River Project and 
construction of the Roosevelt Dam, see Karen Smith, The Magnificent Experiment: Building the Salt River 
Reclamation Project, 1890-1917 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986). 
18
 Like other postwar Southwestern cities, municipal reformers sought to replace partisan “bossism” politics 
with non-partisan administrators. From 1914 to 1949, twenty-four individuals served thirty-one separate 
appointments as Phoenix’s city manager, with the average length of tenure just fourteen months. For the 
quote, see Elizabeth Shermer in Sunbelt Capitalism, 3. Shermer argues Sunbelt cities such as Phoenix were 
at the epicenter of modern Conservatism. For municipal reform in the Southwest specifically, see Chapter 5 
in Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest (Princeton, NJ: University of 
Princeton Press, 1997). For Phoenix and the CGC, see VanderMeer, Desert Visions, chapters 5 and 8,  
Wesley Johnson, “Generations of Elites and Societal Change in Phoenix.” In Community Development in 
the American West: Past and Present Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Frontiers, edited by Jessie L. 
Embry and Howard A. Christy (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1985), 79-109. For more on this issue see 
Carl Abbott, The Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1993), 40-43 and Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt 
Cities (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).  City manager figure comes from Paul 
Kelso, A Decade of Council-Manager Government in Phoenix Arizona (Phoenix: 1960), 7.  
11 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Phoenix Subdivision Construction in Phoenix, 1956 to 1958. The map 
highlights the mountains that surround Phoenix, as well as its major rivers, the Salt and 
Gila. The black dots represent new subdivisions built between 1956 and 1958. Much of 
the development  is around Camelback Mountain and what would later become the 
Phoenix Mountains Preserve.
19
 
 
 Following World War II, urban planning became critical to ensuring growth 
according to Phoenix boosters’ high-tech suburban vision.20 Boosters’ used a variety of 
pitches to attract industry, tourists, and migrants to the Valley of the Sun and transformed 
a city not even in the top 95 most populous in the nation in 1940 into the 12th largest city 
in the nation by 1970.
21
 Coordination between public and private interests, as well as 
                                                          
19
 This image can be found in City of Phoenix and Maricopa County, Land Use in the Phoenix Urban Area: 
A Study Basic to Long Range Planning, Advanced Planning Task Force (Phoenix, 1959), plate 8. 
20
 See VanderMeer, Desert Visions, Part II. 
21
 Census Bureau, “The Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1980,” Table 21 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab21.txt. For the efforts of other 
Sunbelt cities to utilize their climate as part of an urban growth strategy, see Bridges, Morning Glories and 
Abbott, The New Urban America.  
12 
 
between different levels of government was crucial to this growth. Phoenix Chamber of 
Commerce President Frank Snell later emphasized the relationship between public and 
private partnerships in efforts to promote the growth of Phoenix. “You can’t do it 
individually,” Snell explained, “It was a network.”22 The city dedicated itself to planning 
in order to make its leaders’ visions a reality. Following the war, Phoenix had more 
planning officials per capita than almost any other city in the nation.
23
 Phoenix’s growth 
mirrored larger trends in the American West, which added 20 million people between 
1940 and 1970. Between 1960 and 1970, the West contained 20 of the 30 fastest growing 
cities in the nation, both by percentage gain and absolute numbers. Federal money, 
especially defense contracts, helped spur this growth.
24
 
 VanderMeer argued Phoenix boosters “valued nature, but primarily for how it 
could be transformed into a saleable commodity.” Barry Goldwater, a city council 
member with the CGC and later a long-time Senator and failed Presidential candidate, 
later explained that following the war, “The natural thing to which to turn was the 
capitalization of our climate, our natural beauties, and the romance of the desert.” The 
region’s environmental assets---climate, sun, and natural landscape---were ubiquitous in 
boosters’ pitches of the “Arizona Good Life.” Boosters linked these assets to a particular 
kind of quality of life, one that emphasized health, recreation, open spaces, cultural assets 
                                                          
22
 Snell quote is from an interview with Kristina Minister, April 26, 1988, audiotape, side 1, tape 10, and 
side 1, tape 11, Chamber Centennial Oral History Interviews, Greater Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, 
Phoenix. It can be found is Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism, 52. 
23
 See Kelso, A Decade of Council-Manager Government, 58-65. Phoenix ranked fifth in number of 
employees and eighth in expenditures in per capita measures for cities with a population of 250,000 to 
500,000. See, International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book, 1961 (Washington, 
D.C., 1961), 274. 
24
 The Population figure comes from Findlay, Magic Lands, 17-18. For federal support of this growth, see 
ibid, 18-23, Gerald Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century West 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999), 43-74, and Abbott, Metropolitan Frontier, 9 and 70-77. 
13 
 
like museums and parks, efficient municipal services, affordable low-density housing, 
and good jobs. The astonishing growth of the city testified to their success. Between 1940 
and 1980, Phoenix’s population rose from 65,414 to 789,704.25      
 
Figure 2. Phoenix’s Growth Between 1940 and 1980. The image depicts Phoenix’s 
growth in the postwar period. The black area represents the city boundaries in 1958.
26
 
 
 During and after World War II, elected leaders, the Chamber of Commerce, and 
U.S. Congressmen like Carl Hayden and Barry Goldwater helped persuade defense 
                                                          
25
 For the quote see Philip VanderMeer, Desert Visions, 93. For population statistics, see pages 89 and 191. 
For a discussion of Phoenix cultural institutions see pages 65-71, 93-94, and 167-171.Goldwater quote can 
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industries, specifically those related to aircraft, to locate in Phoenix. Clear skies, dry 
weather, and sunshine made Phoenix an ideal place to locate airfields and aviation 
training facilities. Examples include Litchfield Air Force Base at Goodyear, Williams Air 
Field in Mesa, and Luke William’s Air Force Base (now called the Goldwater Air Force 
Range). One Goodyear official commented that because of Phoenix’s sunshine, “planes 
could be flown and tested every day of the year.” President of the Chamber of 
Commerce, Frank Snell, explained the value of clear skies to the area’s economy: the 
Chamber “did not want dirty industries” and if “there was talk of a refinery in this 
area…we [the Chamber of Commerce] did our best to kill it.”27   
 Federal defense contracts and Phoenix’s Chamber brought high-tech 
manufacturing and electronics firms to the Valley, the latter being particularly suitable 
because of the dry climate. During the Second World War, the Aluminum Company of 
America (ALCOA) opened one of the nation’s largest aluminum plants in the Valley. 
AiResearch opened a research lab plant following the war after John J. Ross, President of 
the Company, visited and enjoyed the lifestyle and climate. Electronics giant Motorola 
opened a plant in 1948. University of Arizona researchers queried Motorola executives 
about their choice to locate in Phoenix and executives responded, “the principal factor in 
favor of Phoenix was the city’s outstanding climate and its nation-wide reputation as a 
resort and health center.” Those at Sperry Rand and General Electric, which also opened 
manufacturing centers in the Valley, expressed similar views. Phoenix boosters 
                                                          
27
Frank Snell interview by G. Wesley Johnson, September 22 1977, transcript 6, Phoenix History Project; 
Allen Rosenberg interview by Kristina Minister, March 28, 1989, audiotape, side 2, tape 11, Chamber 
Interviews; Board of Directors, Minutes of Meeting, July 11, 1949, 4, volume: “1949-1950,” Board of 
Directors Records, Greater Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, Phoenix. The quotes were found in Shermer, 
Sunbelt Capitalism.  
15 
 
emphasized to potential tourists and migrants, that “no smokestacks insult the Arizona 
sky.” Other factors that influenced companies to relocate to Phoenix were favorable 
right-to-work laws, as well as low taxes on industry.
28
 
 The environment became a primary attraction in bringing tourists to the area. 
Snell explained the goals of the Chamber of Commerce’s 1946-1947 national advertising 
campaign: to extend the tourist season, to cause dissatisfaction with the winter climate in 
the Midwest and northeast, and to promote the Valley as a resort area. By the mid-1950s, 
both Phoenix and Maricopa County paid $50,000 annually to fund advertising campaigns 
in local, regional, and national magazines. Funds rose to $85,000 by 1962. The economic 
value of tourism grew 111% in the next two years: in 1951, the city did not have enough 
rooms for 10,000 visitors, but by the end of the decade, the city had 43,000 available 
rooms for tourists.
29
 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, Arizona consistently ranked in the top three states in 
net migration, with most moving to urban centers like Phoenix. A survey by Arizona 
Highways, a state-funded magazine, found that non-Arizona subscribers (94% of their 
total subscribers), who said they planned to move to the state within the next ten years 
most often cited the climate, for both its health values and the opportunity it afforded for 
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outdoor recreation, as their top reason.
30
 Moreover, according to a 1979 community 
survey, 78% of respondents cited the climate as a factor they most liked about the city, 
more than any other factor. The second and third most cited factors were the “friendly 
people” and amenities, like outdoor recreation, education, and cultural facilities. 
Homebuilders emphasized these amenities to potential buyers, often referencing 
environmental factors in the name of subdivisions. For example, Del Webb built Sun City 
as a retirement community that specifically targeted out of state residents. 
Advertisements emphasized outdoor activities, such as golf, hiking, and gardening. On 
January 1, 1960, thousands flocked to the opening of Sun City.
31
  
 Backyards became extensions of the living environment. Phoenix builder Cliff 
May explained, “you do not just take the outdoors as it is. You manipulate it for your 
own purposes.”Advertisements depicted backyards with kids playing in the pool, a proud 
father tending the barbeque while mom set the table in the lush green grass; often they 
noted swimming and outdoor activities were possible almost year-round. A 1955 article 
in Arizona Highways attempted to lure migrants using Phoenix’s unique environment: 
“When the work at your desk, whatever it be, grows dull, you have only to listen to the 
call of Arizona’s awakening. Close your eyes and see the breezes tousling the heads of 
flowers on the Desert.” The magazine consistently featured the unique aspects of the 
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Arizona’s environment. The Grand Canyon, the state’s most iconic and incredible natural 
wonder, graced the cover of the magazine more than any other subject, appearing 25 
times from 1925 to1972. Cacti appeared as the most photographed image in the 
magazine. A Holiday magazine article noted that Phoenicians “can escape to desert and 
mountain picnic areas of untouched natural beauty, ten minutes from Phoenix.” Boosters’ 
efforts paid off, as letters came into the mayor offices from potential migrants seeking 
employment in the city, noting the climate as a primary factor. Furthermore, only 28.9% 
of the 581,346 persons aged five years or older who lived in the Phoenix metropolitan 
area in 1960 had been there prior to 1955.
32
 
 
Urban Planning, Environmental Planning in Postwar Phoenix 
 During the 1950s, the city’s population grew 311%, the highest percentage 
growth of any in the nation during the decade, but the city soon also contended with the 
unintended environmental consequences of urban growth.
33
 One of the first ways in 
which city officials sought to incorporate postwar environmental concern into urban 
growth policy was through the creation of a metropolitan sewage system. Municipal 
officials and engineers worried over the public health threat caused by the proliferation of 
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failure-prone septic systems in suburban developments that created unsanitary 
environmental conditions. Through public campaigns and citizen involvement, city 
officials persuaded voters to approve several large bond elections for municipal sewer 
expansions and improvements to deal with the problem. With significant assistance from 
federal funds, the city created a centralized sewage treatment facility and extended 
municipal sewer lines to suburban areas to curb the public and environmental health 
threat of faulty and overcrowded septic tank systems, but did little to restrain suburban 
growth, and in many ways encouraged it.  
 Unlike the extension of municipal sewers and the later construction of West 
Papago-Inner Loop, city officials in the 1960s explicitly restricted growth in an important 
recreation area in the valley by prohibiting land development on Camelback Mountain 
and protecting the area as open space. In the 1960s, a citywide grassroots campaign 
helped raise support to protect the city’s most iconic natural landmark. Moreover, the 
successful campaign reveals the benefits of public-private collaboration, as well as 
cooperation among multiple levels of government as federal funds paid for nearly half of 
the land purchases required for preserving the mountain. Camelback Mountain, and its 
aesthetic and recreational value, congealed with many Phoenicians’ preference for low-
density development and wide-open skies that brought many to the Valley in the first 
place. In a 1977 survey, open space or access to open space was the most commonly cited 
factor among residents in selecting a place to live. Over three-quarters said they would 
rather live near open space than not.
34
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 The fight over West Papago-Inner Loop in the 1970s demonstrates the limits of 
the incorporation of environmentalism into postwar urban growth policy. First, many 
Phoenicians and especially government officials at the local and state level believed that 
only a freeway could serve the city’s transportation needs because mass transit 
alternatives did not mesh with the city’s alleged low density construction. They argued 
that mass transit such as rapid rail required higher population densities in the city, even 
though the city’s density was about the average in the nation when excluding the 
substantial amount of land preserved in mountain parks.
35
 While freeways and 
automobiles provided freedom in mobility, mass transit seemed rigid and restrictive. 
Moreover, many believed only freeways could continue to foster urban growth, which 
rallied business interests to strongly support freeways in a very effective public campaign 
that wore down opposition groups. Last, federal policies provided generous subsidies to 
freeway construction, while offering little funding assistance to mass transit alternatives 
until the 1980s. The debate over the West Papago-Inner Loop underscores the difficulty 
in incorporating environmental values in public policy when it required significant social 
and cultural change to the suburban lifestyle that drew so many to Phoenix. City leaders 
promoted suburban development, which many pro-freeway advocates later conflated with 
low-density development to argue that the city needed a transit system that relied heavily 
on freeways instead of mass transit. The construction of freeways then impacted the 
suburban feel of the city as freeways had to be built all over the metropolitan area, often 
adjacent to formerly quiet bucolic neighborhoods. While 70% of the city in 1977 believed 
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Phoenix had been growing too fast, 34% of those respondents also claimed the city’s 
density was too high. Moreover, the likelihood that someone felt the city grew too fast 
and that the density was too high increased with the duration of residency in Phoenix.
36
 
 The values of incoming migrants and decisions made by policymakers in the 
postwar period had lasting impact on contemporary Phoenix’s natural and built 
environment. Therefore, an examination of those key historical decisions can provide 
insight into policy decisions today that will guide the city’s growth into the twenty-first 
century. While not every consequence of a policy decision is knowable, the lasting 
impact of decisions demonstrates the importance of long-term planning and the need to 
consider carefully the environmental effects of development plans. 
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Chapter 2: Sprawl and Septic Tanks: Urban Growth and Pestilence in Phoenix, 1946-
1964 
 As urban areas expanded rapidly following World War II, municipal officials 
across the nation concerned themselves with ensuring orderly growth and public health; 
orderly meaning the maintenance of growth without sacrificing what Phoenix Mayor Sam 
Mardian described in 1963 as the elements of a “mature city.”37 These included parks, 
libraries, fire and police protection, water and sewers. In Phoenix and across the nation, 
municipal officials increasingly turned their attention to pestilent conditions in growing 
suburban fringe areas due to poorly designed individual human waste disposal systems. 
In 1954, Mark Hollis, Assistant Surgeon General and Chief Engineer of the U.S. Public 
Health Service (USPHS), explained that sanitary engineering is “a science of the 
environment” that sought to “eliminate those stresses man need not bear and to moderate 
those which he must.”38 Throughout the nation, municipal officials, engineers, and the 
public recognized that their health was linked to the health of the environment, which the 
proliferation of septic tanks in suburban subdivisions threatened. Suburban development 
in fringe areas of cities often came at the expense of the countryside; 60% of the new 
urban territory added in Phoenix between 1955 and 1975 came from desert and mountain 
areas on the city’s fringe.39 Throughout the 1950s, municipal leaders, often following 
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alarming pollution reports, tried to improve sanitation systems in the face of rapid urban 
development.  
 While city governments usually managed centralized sewer and waste treatment 
systems in the urban core, individual waste disposal systems, especially septic tanks, 
proliferated in the suburban and rural areas. Subdivision developers preferred septic tanks 
because they reduced costs and expedited the building process compared to connecting to 
municipal sewers or creating a neighborhood-wide sewer of their own. Septic tanks 
became a major public health concern because human waste often seeped into 
homeowners’ drinking water wells or emerged at the surface exposing people and 
wildlife to domestic sewage. By 1960, a large body of evidence had accumulated that 
suggested the contamination of groundwater by septic tanks. For example, the USPHS 
found that synthetic detergents had shown up in 37% of drinking wells tested for 
contaminants, traveling from washing machines through septic tanks and into the 
groundwater. If the detergent suds had made it to the groundwater, then it was quite 
likely the wells also experienced biological contamination from effluent that had been 
seeping its way into the water supply. Nationwide one-third of subdivision septic tanks 
failed within the first three years.
40
 The widespread and high risk of water contamination 
led to increasing collaboration between local, state, and national governments to find 
solutions to the problem.  
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 During the 1950s, federal aid for homes and government defense contracts, as 
well as successful efforts by city boosters to promote Phoenix caused the city’s 
population to grow 311%, the highest rate of any city in the nation. The expansion of the 
Phoenix metropolitan area created problems for municipal officials, who attempted to 
maintain the quality of life expectations of citizens in the valley: low-density and 
affordable housing, and environmental quality. A series of federal laws provided funds to 
help mitigate the threat of water contamination through the expansion of sewer lines, 
construction of water treatment plants, and the creation and expansion of regulatory 
bodies. Phoenix’s experience provides one example of how desire for environmental 
quality intersected with public health concerns to influence urban growth policy 
following World War II.
41
 
 In this case, environmental concern and policy reform came from the top-down. 
Municipal officials, engineers and other technical experts drove these efforts, not only for 
the altruistic reasons of ensuring public health, but as part of a larger campaign to 
promote the growth of the city. Still, sanitation efforts received public support via bond 
approvals, participation in citizens’ committees, and in some cases, the formation of 
sanitary districts to petition for sewers. Phoenix officials mostly struggled to keep waste 
treatment at pace with urban growth during the 1950s and early 1960s because the city’s 
jurisdictional reach was limited and real estate developers enjoyed the more libertarian, 
less regulated style of government in the county. The concern over inadequate sanitary 
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systems provided significant support for coordinated planning because they threatened 
public health, which along with other environmental considerations, became key 
components of urban planning. Additionally, to prevent unincorporated areas in the 
county from becoming “satellite towns” and suburban subdivisions that “landlocked” 
Phoenix’s growth the city undertook extensive annexation campaigns in the 1950s.42 
During this campaign, Phoenix officials specifically used municipal services to support 
their campaigns, as they promised the public more and better service at a cheaper price as 
part of a municipal sewer system. Often the city extended services prior to annexation to 
make it more appealing to people there and an easier transition into city governance. 
Phoenix later collaborated with other cities in the metropolitan area, as well as state and 
national governments to find comprehensive sanitary solutions.   
 The construction and expansion of the 91
st
 Avenue Sewage Treatment Plant 
marks the beginning of a comprehensive sewage network based on future planning, as 
opposed to the extension of services to areas already blighted by unsanitary systems. 
While sewage treatment plants effectively curbed contamination of water from human 
excrement, the plant required continuous expansions to accommodate the metropolitan 
area’s growth over the last fifty years. Moreover, by the 1960s and 1970s environmental 
concern shifted to toxic chemical contaminants. In this way, the sources of environmental 
concerns have evolved, but a desire to maintain public and environmental health 
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remained essential to urban growth and planning. Furthermore, the expansion of sewers 
in the metropolitan area marks some of the earliest cooperation between municipalities in 
the Valley of the Sun, and reveals the benefits of collaborative decision-making and 
comprehensive planning in solving environmental problems.
43
  
 
Post-War Urban Sprawl and Septic Tanks 
 Following World War II, a host of macroeconomic factors fueled the demand for 
housing: increased standard of living, federal subsidies, new home building techniques, 
and a desire for open space outside crowded cities. Post-war legislation, such as the G.I. 
Bill and other federal policies aided returning veterans in purchasing homes, while 
federal spending created a wealth of new jobs, especially in the defense and high-tech 
manufacturing industry, which opened many offices in Phoenix.
44
 To meet the surging 
demand for homes, builders’ like William Levitt of New York used prefabricated 
materials and specialized labor to assemble homes quickly and at minimal costs. In 
Phoenix, no other builder utilized postwar homebuilding techniques better than John 
Long. In 1956, he won first prize in the “under $16,000” category of the American 
Builder Awards for his $9,800 home that included all the amenities of modern living: 
three bedrooms, a pool, and wiring for a washing machine within a community of gently 
winding streets and cul-de-sacs. The next year Long set a housing record when he 
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constructed 115 homes in only four days. Overall, the efforts of Long and other Phoenix 
area builders resulted in homes costing about 10% less than elsewhere in nation for 
comparable size ranch homes throughout the 1950s.
45
  
 Growth on the urban fringe also resulted from producer and consumer desires. 
Many of the homes built in the Phoenix metropolitan area by developers like John Long 
occurred on the fringe of the city boundary, where they could keep land costs down by 
putting distance between themselves and other subdivisions, as well as avoid city taxes. 
Moreover, development in outlying areas also allowed builders to create larger lot sizes 
for homes. Suburban homes also reflected consumers’ desire for the “good life.” Phoenix 
Planning Director John Beatty summarized the consumer desire for suburban living and 
the rapid growth of the area: 
 [T]he shift of population to the fringe areas can be reasoned to be the individual’s 
 desire for more room and air, his desire to raise his family in a suburban 
 atmosphere, as escape from city regulations and most important, because of the 
 large percentage of new residential construction which is going on  outside the 
 city limits.
46
 
 
 As a result, the Phoenix fringe area population grew at a more rapid rate than the 
central city through the 1940s. In 1950, the central city contained a population of 106,818 
while the surrounding unincorporated area had a population of 224,952. The revenue 
generated by the city from home building permits reflected the increased volume of 
homebuilding in the metropolitan area: in 1952, the value of permits totaled $13,182,472 
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and by 1959, that number ballooned to $89,621,786. Federal Housing Administration 
Commissioner Julian Zimmerman noted the importance of federal funds to this growth, 
which provided low-interest loans to builders and consumers. He visited Phoenix in 1958 
and reported that about 90% of FHA loans in the city went towards new home 
construction. Moreover, FHA loans accounted for nearly half of all loans processed in 
Phoenix in 1959.
47
  
 The appeal of septic tanks for builders was mostly financial, but also stemmed 
from a desire to build homes quickly. Homebuilders in Phoenix and elsewhere sought 
cheaper land, which meant putting distance between themselves and other subdivisions, 
as well as public utilities because beginning in 1951, homes built within the city limits 
required connection to the public sewer system. Septic tanks required less up-front capital 
than the construction of neighborhood sewage-treatment systems or connection to a 
municipal system, so that instead of massive preconstruction costs, developers could 
install individual systems simultaneous with the construction of each home. Moreover, 
using individual sewage disposal systems circumvented the need for comprehensive 
subdivision sewer plans, which usually required more time and money, the antithesis of 
postwar homebuilding principles. Thus, septic tanks congealed with suburban ideals and 
pervaded there. “The demand for housing outstripped the ability to supply sewer and 
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central treatment plants,” an EPA report later explained, “and the unsatisfied demand was 
generally met by providing septic tanks and cesspools.”48 
 Erma Bombeck opens her best-selling novel on life in the suburbs, The Grass is 
Always Greener over the Septic Tank, with a woman sinking into the mire of soggy 
marshland. “‘It’s a septic tank’” the women realizes, “’I’ve discovered the suburbs!’”49 
Satire aside, Bombeck relates a key component of postwar suburban sprawl. In the mid-
1950s, the number of septic tanks in the country was increasing by roughly 400,000 to 
500,000 per year. However, septic tanks soon became a symbol of the folly of unplanned 
growth and increasingly a threat to the environment and public health. Discussions 
concerning septic tanks filled the pages of popular journals such as American Home, 
Better Homes and Gardens, Popular Mechanics, and Good Housekeeping, as well as 
engineering, homebuilding, and public works trade journals. Often, the discussion 
centered on the threat malfunctioning septic systems posed to public health.
50
 
 
Pestilent Nation  
 Septic tank systems consist of three main parts: a settling (septic) tank, 
distribution box, and an absorption field or seepage pit. Effluent leaves the home, travels 
through a sewer line and enters the settling tank. There, heavier solids settle at bottom 
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and become sludge while lighter particles, mostly greases, rise to the top of the liquid and 
are retained as scum. Anaerobic bacteria, which thrive in the absence of oxygen, then 
decompose a significant portion of both sludge and scum into liquids so that household 
wastes may be more readily absorbed into the surrounding soil. Liquids travel through 
pipes to the distribution box, which channels effluent to several lateral leaching lines to 
spread waste equally across the absorption field or seepage pit. Absorption of liquids 
occurs through an open-jointed system of pipes laid in trenches partially filled with 
course filter material, like sand or gravel, as liquids seep into the soil. Meanwhile, gases 
vent out of the tank, usually through a home’s plumbing stack. Then, all that remains is 
the solid materials, which requires cleaning the tank and disposing of the waste 
periodically. During the 1950s and 1960s, sanitarians acknowledged that septic tanks 
worked as a preliminary treatment, but seldom treated waste to the degree they would call 
“sanitary.” Septic systems worked fine in theory and were appropriate technology for 
rural areas with plenty of room for a leach field and setbacks for a drinking water well, 
but they became problematic when placed in suburban subdivisions with less room. 
Failures typically occurred from human negligence or misunderstanding that resulted in 
improper design, installation, and maintenance. The expansion of municipal sewers 
sought to prevent the installation of septic tanks altogether.
51
   
 Concern with septic tanks and urban water quality prevailed nationwide, and 
underscores the difficulty in controlling urban growth and its unintended consequences 
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after World War II. In 1945, septic tanks served 17 million people, predominantly in 
suburban or rural areas, and by 1960, that number rose to 49 million.
52
 Cities in the 
“Sunbelt,” like Las Vegas, Tucson, and San Diego in the Southwest, as well as Atlanta, 
Miami, and Charlotte in the South, experienced tremendous urban growth after World 
War II. Many soon came to believe this growth was uncontrolled, which as historian John 
Findlay explained, “bred a kind of powerlessness over the urban scene.”53 FHA officials 
were some of the first to recognize issues with septic tanks, as they helped finance 
mortgages across the nation and worked with local health departments to inspect homes. 
  The agency conducted studies and surveys through the late 1940s and 1950s and 
began to publish reports and technical bulletins, primarily for homebuilders and public 
health officials. In 1955, the Veterans Administration issued a report on septic tanks in 
which they described them as a “menace to public health.” One official likened septic 
tanks to “a country cousin that came to town and got into trouble,” and noted that “in its 
place---a rural setting,” septic tanks worked fine, “but it was never intended for use in 
settlements with more than one family dwelling per acre.”  Another recalled “tracts of 
homes with failing septic-tank systems.” An urban planner faulted septic tanks for 
creating “chaos in the suburbs.” Sanitarians looked on in horror at the spread of septic 
systems, which threatened to bring back the “old and presumably solved problem” of 
sanitation from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. They concluded cities 
and counties needed to create metropolitan authorities to plan for growth and ensure the 
adequate provision of public services to protect public health. Importantly, this included 
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building the human capacity to recognize the development issues related to public health. 
At a nationwide conference on water contamination in 1961, U.S. Chief Sanitary 
Engineer Robert Taft noted that while improvements had been made, “continued rapid 
population growth in the suburbs kept the areas with septic systems constantly 
expanding, making this an ongoing problem.” Local officials, including those in 
Maricopa County and Phoenix, agreed. During the 1950s and 1960s, they echoed national 
concern over the lack of funding, regulation, infrastructure, and trained personnel to deal 
with the issue.
54
   
 
Pestilent Phoenix, 1946-1957  
 In 1946, one sewage treatment plant served the city of Phoenix: the 23
rd
 Avenue 
Sewage Treatment Plant. The city constructed the plant in 1932 in anticipation of an 
additional 20,000 people estimated to become part of the city’s population, but septic 
tanks continued to prevail where municipal sewers’ reach ended.55 That year the Director 
of the Division of Sanitation of the State Department of Health explained that growth 
beyond Phoenix’s limits resulted in “many hundreds of cesspools and septic tanks.” In 
1948, the USPHS conducted a study of dysentery and diarrhea, and selected five cities to 
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test a new fly control program. With an infant diarrhea rate three times the national 
average, the USPHS chose Phoenix as one the cities for the five-year federal program. 
The study identified disease-carrying flies that bred in areas outside the city limits where 
lax county regulations led to inadequate waste disposal systems that produced conditions 
for pathogens and breeding flies that acted as vectors. In 1949, city officials counted 649 
privies and discovered a fly count fifteen times greater in one recently annexed area in 
south Phoenix than in other parts of the city. The recently annexed area had previously 
been mostly farmland but was undergoing residential development. As a result, the city 
extended municipal sewer lines to the area, but many other pockets of pestilence 
remained outside city limits. By now, the city and state both identified these conditions as 
a threat to public health and detrimental to its quality of life. “Certainly,” the State Health 
Department proclaimed in its annual report, “a safe water supply should be expected by 
citizens of every community in this modern state.”56  
 Of the 69,000 people living in the fringe of the Phoenix metropolitan area in 
1951, only 739 homes connected to city sewer services. The rest relied on septic tanks 
and cesspools. Homes beyond the city’s official limits fell under the jurisdiction of 
Maricopa County. In 1951, the County Health Department consisted of only five 
sanitarians, which meant that if one considers only the fringe area, each sanitarian had 
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responsibility for nearly 14,000 homes.
57
 The State Health Department, which gave final 
approval of subdivisions following the County’s inspection, also found itself 
“insufficiently staffed with trained sanitary engineers and sanitarians.” Therefore, 
challenges abounded at multiple levels of government. All identified septic tanks and 
cesspools as the primary and continued threat to human and environmental health.
58
 
 In November of 1952, municipal and health department officials from around 
Arizona met in Phoenix to discuss the most pressing challenges they faced. There, they 
identified problems associated with suburban development as a primary concern to 
ensuring public health, and further noted woefully understaffed and underfunded local 
health departments as an obstacle. “Unplanned sprawl,” Phoenix Planning Director John 
Beatty explained, “describes perfectly the situation” in some areas. He went on to 
describe the “miserable consequences of unplanned sprawl”: limited sewers, minimal fire 
and police protection, and essentially no parks. He argued for a collective sewage system 
designed to serve the entire metropolitan area and advocated for more collaboration 
between local, county, and state agencies, as well as more emphasis on long-term 
planning.
59
 
 In 1953, the city of Phoenix commissioned Headman, Ferguson & Carollo 
Consulting Engineers to assess its sewage system and provide recommendations. The 
firm concluded that “the suburban aspect of the Phoenix Metropolitan sewerage problem 
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is the most critical one,” surpassing the problem within in the city “to a very considerable 
degree” because it involved an aggregate population approximately equal to the city, but 
almost completely lacking municipal service. Suburban areas relied on local underground 
disposal through the “generally uncertain, uneconomical, and frequently trouble-some 
septic tank and cesspool.”60   
 Carollo also identified two large contiguous suburban areas abutting Phoenix. 
These areas contained an aggregate population of 65,000 people, some of which already 
received sewer service from the city, but largely relied on septic tanks for their sewage 
disposal needs. In 1953, the northwest area formed Phoenix Sanitary District #1, roughly 
bounded by Bethany Road on the northern slope of Camelback Mountain, 56
th
 Street to 
the east, the Southern Pacific Railroad to the south, and at its furthest west, 16
th
 Street 
(See Figure 3). The District commissioned its own engineering report, which reached 
similar conclusions as Carollo: “the need for a sanitary sewer system in the District is 
rapidly becoming acute” due to rapid population growth. In 1950, the area had a 
population of 21,000, up from 7,000 a decade prior, and by 1953, it mushroomed to 
37,000. The reliance on septic tanks caused concern. “In an area where the population 
density is increasing as it is here,” the report exhorted, “this practice becomes a sanitary 
hazard and a public health nuisance.” Within a few years, much of these two contiguous 
suburban areas became part of the city through annexation.
61
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 A concurrent study by the USPHS of the Gila River Basin, which included the 
Phoenix metropolitan area, echoed similar concerns, noting “ineffectual” septic tanks 
posed a threat not only to those in the immediate area, but also “the diner many miles 
away who consumes inadequately washed fresh vegetables” watered with contaminated 
groundwater.
62
 Both reports advocated expanding the municipal sewer system “farther 
and farther out into the suburbs whenever and wherever required” to ensure orderly 
growth and protect public health.
63
  
 The State Health Department reported that gastroenteritis (diarrhea or stomach 
flu) was the fourth leading cause of childhood deaths in the state in 1953. These diseases 
commonly resulted from drinking water contaminated with human waste. The State 
Health Department declared sanitation “a way of life” and identified the prevalence of 
individual waste disposal systems in the mushrooming suburbs as a threat to that quality 
of life. While the Maricopa County Health Department inspected 692 septic tanks and 
cesspools in 1952, it struggled to keep up with the rapid development of the area as the 
construction of hundreds of new subdivision homes continued to stress the Department’s 
resources. Blighted areas on the fringe of Phoenix continued to threaten water supplies 
and public health.
64
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Figure 3. Map of Phoenix Sewer System and Sanitary Districts. The map shows existing 
municipal sewer lines in 1953, largely concentrated in the urban core. It also shows the 
three sanitary districts on the outskirts of Phoenix. Phoenix’s city limits follow the Grand 
Canal in the north and bend toward Gateway Park in the east at Van Buren Street before 
heading south and then west along the Southern Pacific Railroad to 35
th
 Ave where it 
curves at Indian School Road back toward the Grand Canal.
65
 
 
 In 1955, the same year the VA issued a report cautioning against the use of septic 
tanks, the Maricopa County Health Department asked for sole responsibility for 
inspection and approval of all subdivision homes sponsored by the VA and FHA in 
addition to the non-VA and non-FHA homes they already inspected. The federal agencies 
approved the request, but the Health Department had never before undertaken such 
responsibilities. At the time, 25,000 subdivision homes, or 70% of homes in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area, relied on septic tanks, treating roughly 15 million gallons of sewage 
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daily.
66
 County Health officials, now in charge of inspecting the systems, lacked the 
resources necessary to carry out their duties to protect public health. The Health 
Department had seven field sanitarians on staff, two of whom only monitored food and 
drink establishments. This left five individuals responsible for 182 subdivisions, or 
roughly 12,740 homes in the first year. In its first year, the County inspected only 508 
septic tanks. Moreover, the health department lacked state or county regulations for septic 
tanks and therefore relied on relatively lax Federal Housing Administration standards.
67
 
 By 1956, the County Health Department found septic tanks a persistent problem. 
A lack of housing and plumbing regulations in the County, though, handicapped the 
agency’s ability to regulate septic systems in the fringe area and did little to ensure 
builders and homeowners’ understood how to install and properly maintain septic 
systems. The Division emphasized major sewerage problems in suburban areas around 
Phoenix, in particular the west Valley near Glendale, Gila Bend, and Buckeye. Much of 
this area became part of the metropolitan sewer system.
68
 
 The problems identified by the health department were directly attributable to 
suburban sprawl. Increasing land values in the metropolitan area encouraged builders to 
put large homes on small lots to maximize profit, but this left little room for the proper 
installation of septic systems. Builders often installed waste disposal systems too close to 
the foundation of homes, which placed undue stress on seepage pits from the home 
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settling above it, increasing the chance of subsidence. Another problem caused by the 
lack of space for adequate sewage systems occurred between the seepage pit and the 
septic tank. In almost every case where a septic tank tilted and broke connection lines, 
inspectors found the cause to be the weakening of the soil structure by percolation from a 
seepage pit located too close to a tank. In the inspection of one subdivision, sanitarians 
found 22 of 50 homes had septic tanks one size too small. This increased the likelihood 
of a system overflowing. More alarming, health department officials encountered, from 
time to time, “an almost unbelievable situation…a septic tank installed backwards.” If 
left in this condition the homeowner would soon find their waste quickly clogged and 
flowing back into their house: through their faucets, out of their toilet, and up through 
their drains. A situation anything but sanitary.
69
 
 A number of technical soil problems affected the design and construction of septic 
tanks, often beyond postwar builders’ knowledge. The key to an effective system was 
finding the area below ground that allowed good percolation and far enough from ground 
water, but this “Goldie Locks Zone” differed greatly across the Valley, making 
standardized septic tank systems largely ineffective, and necessitating inspections of 
every proposed system to ensure proper conditions for the installation and design of the 
septic tank. The use of seepage pits dismayed public health officials, who noted the 
danger of groundwater contamination. Sanitarians found in one instance the “Goldilocks 
Zone” was 18-feet below ground for one home while another across the street was 98-
feet. Another four to five square mile section of the metropolitan area containing eight or 
nine subdivisions, water tables varied from 12 to 30 feet below ground. Individual 
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inspections of each lot required a great deal of time and resources from an already 
overburdened agency. In some cases, the State Health Department allowed builders to 
hire their own engineer to conduct inspections, and then forward the report along for 
approval to the County to expedite the process. The State Health Department found many 
of the seepage pits received approval for sewage disposal before the County commenced 
its supervisory program.
 
Subsidence had already occurred at several properties.
70
  
 In addition, consumer ignorance about maintenance also contributed to pestilence 
in the suburbs. The responsibility for maintaining septic tanks fell upon homeowners. 
Unfortunately, municipal officials and professional sanitarians too often found that 
homeowners lacked adequate knowledge to maintain and repair septic tanks properly. 
Many failures resulted from the lack of regular maintenance for sludge build up and 
pumping, so that the tanks overflow. Often, this took only one to three years to occur, 
especially if the rate of addition of new wastes is greater than the ability of the septic tank 
to break down waste or the soil to absorb. The prevalence of garbage disposals, a new 
appliance of modern living in suburban homes, increased the amount of waste going into 
septic tanks and thus contributed to their failure. Phoenix’s concern over water quality 
and sanitation problems mirrored dismay elsewhere in the nation, 
.
as one-third of septic 
tanks nationwide failed within the first four years.
71
 The Sanitary Division of the County 
Health Department explained that they constantly received complaints about individuals 
servicing and emptying individual sewage disposal systems in inappropriate areas. Often, 
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individuals either neglected maintenance or did so with equipment too small, which led to 
waste strewn on the highway or dumped into the nearest manhole, stream, or ditch.
72
 
Other cities in the metropolitan area faced similar challenges. 
 In 1957, the City Manager of Glendale, W.A. Gilchrist, noted deficiencies with 
the city’s sanitary sewers. Built in 1920, Glendale’s plant proved insufficient to meet the 
city’s growing needs, which caused “a critical sanitary sewer problem for many years.” 
Gilchrist stated, “there was almost no treatment” from Glendale’s small plant because 
“the community was rapidly outgrowing the collection system and, due to adverse grades, 
it was impossible to extend the sewer system to serve all areas inside the present city 
limits.” Between 1940 and 1950, the population of Glendale grew by 91%, from 8,179 to 
15,696. Much of Glendale’s growth resulted from annexations of subdivision 
developments. Part of the growth explosion in the western area around Glendale stemmed 
from the construction of John Long’s master-planned community in 1955, Maryvale, 
which contracted with the city of Phoenix for sewer services.
73
  
 Government officials likened individual sewage disposal systems to an adversary 
in their efforts to ensure orderly growth and protect public health. They remained 
confident in their abilities to overcome this challenge--so long as they received a 
sufficient number of skilled engineers, the funds required to carry out their activities and 
construct the proper infrastructure, and good planning. One Phoenix utility engineer 
compared the city’s sanitary problems to Greek hero Hercules’s task to clean the Augean 
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stables, left unclean for over thirty years, noting that to clean Phoenix required no act of 
god, but science, engineering, and good planning.
74
  
 
Federal Solutions for a Sanitary Nation  
 “If we do not halt pollution,” a USPHS report proclaimed, “we will not be able to 
meet the needs of a growing population and expanding economy.” In response to 
nationwide concerns over water quality, the U.S. Congress passed the Water Pollution 
Control Act, which became effective July 31, 1956. A federal report on sewage treatment 
noted that municipalities had spent only half the required amount necessary for adequate 
sewage disposal. The Act emphasized that, “Water pollution is a national problem but a 
local job.” It expanded on the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act, which only offered 
funds to states for the management of interstate bodies of water, to include federal grants 
to municipalities to assist in building sewage treatment works. The law sought to 
“accelerate programs of treatment works by providing an incentive to take action now.” 
The law made federal grants up to $250,000 or 30% of the total cost of a sewage 
treatment works available. In the first two years, Congress appropriated $95 million, over 
80% of which went to new construction of sewage treatment works. In the first year, the 
federal government spent $38 million, with communities adding $129 million of their 
own; the local-federal ratio of funds demonstrates municipalities’ eagerness for the funds 
and importance placed on ensuring adequate sewer systems and treatment plants. 
Between 1945 and 1970, the population served by sewage treatment plants in the U.S. 
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nearly tripled. The Act also established the Water Pollution Surveillance System for 
nationwide sampling and analysis for major national-water courses, as well as an 
inventory of water treatment works updated every five years. In addition, the law offered 
funds to set up state agencies or aid the operation of existing agencies to study methods to 
prevent water pollution.
75
 
 The prevalence of septic tanks and concern over the public health threat caused by 
their malfunction also prompted action by the USPHS. One sanitary engineer explained, 
“at best, septic tanks and subsurface sewage disposal systems are poor substitutes for the 
treatment of domestic sewage.” In 1957, over 24 million people relied on nearly six 
million individual sewage waste disposal systems to treat their wastewater. That same 
year, the UPHS issued its Manual on Septic Tank Practice, which offered guidelines, 
recommendations, and technical information regarding the design, installation, 
maintenance, and proper use of septic tanks systems. It emphasized however, the 
solutions proposed by sanitarians and municipal officials: “connection to an adequate 
public sewerage system is the most satisfactory method of disposing of sewage.” 
Moreover, the Manual underscored the importance of adequate sewers and listed a 
number of diseases associated with water contaminated by sewage: typhoid fever, 
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dysentery, and various types of diarrhea. These federal policies soon trickled down to 
influence municipal and state policy.
76
 
 
Local Solutions for a Sanitary City: Phoenix, 1946-1957  
 The city and county took a number of actions to improve sanitary conditions 
where lax regulations that provided little control over suburban development led to the 
proliferation of faulty septic tanks. Both the city and county expanded their 
environmental sanitation and public health departments, which merged in 1957 to more 
efficiently address sanitary problems. Most importantly, Phoenix expanded its municipal 
sewer system. Federal aid from the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act, as well as publicly 
supported municipal bonds funded these efforts. Municipal officials aggressively pursued 
and promoted the expansion of sewers, utilizing sanitary reports to launch public 
campaigns to defeat pestilence. Moreover, the extension of urban services like municipal 
sewers became a staple in annexation campaigns whose primary purpose was to ensure 
orderly growth by preventing the development of satellite towns that would limit 
Phoenix’s growth and create inefficiency in governance with hundreds of jurisdictions in 
the valley with varying laws and regulations.
77
 Eventually, Phoenix officials’ desire for 
orderly growth and the maintenance of public health helped spur the creation of a 
centralized, metropolitan area sewage system with several other cities in the Valley of the 
Sun. 
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 In 1946, the city expanded the 23
rd
 Avenue Sewage Treatment Plant’s capacity to 
20 million gallons per day to meet the needs of a growing population. Located in 
southern Phoenix along the Salt River near Broadway Road and 23
rd
 Avenue, gravity 
guided effluent down to the Plant.
78
 In 1951, Phoenix updated its city code for the first 
time in twelve years and included a new provision that stipulated “anybody with lot, 
ground, or premises within the city and installs or installed a toilet, urinal, lavatory, wash 
basin, or other like thing shall connect or cause to be connected to the city sewer.” This 
provided legal precedent to sewer new construction within the city, but did not address 
the critical problem of areas outside the city’s jurisdiction.79  
 City officials quickly took action based on the recommendations in the 1953 
Sewerage report. They sought to connect unsewered areas on the suburban fringe, as well 
as within Phoenix, to the city’s municipal system. From 1953 to 1957, the city 
constructed over 300 miles of sewer lines both within the city limits and in fringe areas, 
and in the process connected 26,000 homes to the municipal sewer system. To help offset 
the costs of this expansion and encourage outlying areas to join the city, users outside the 
city paid a higher monthly rate.
80
 In both cases, the expansion of the sewer system 
received strong public support. The successful annexation campaigns during the 1950s 
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and the formation of sanitary districts showed that people living on the fringe desired 
connection to a municipal system, among other services, while voter approval of large 
general obligation bonds demonstrates support within the city for the expansion of 
sewers.  
 In order to extend sewers outside city limits, as well as entice annexation to 
Phoenix, the city encouraged fringe areas to form sanitary districts, which could connect 
to city sewers. Sanitary districts made annexation both more appealing because residents 
would enjoy the benefit of city services, and an easier process to administer because areas 
would already be connected to municipal services. Under Arizona law, only 
unincorporated towns or settlements could organize as a sanitary district. To do so, the 
unincorporated area needed to obtain the signatures of people representing at least 51% 
of total land ownership in a petition that they then submitted to a County Board of 
Supervisors. The petition also had to include evidence that the establishment of a district 
promoted public health, comfort, convenience, necessity, or welfare. If the board of 
supervisors approved the petition, then the district became a municipal corporation 
capable of contracting with a city for municipal services. The sanitary improvement 
district system disadvantaged areas outside the city that lacked the affluence to pay the 
higher outside rental fees; places like South Phoenix, where large minority populations 
lived. These areas connected to the municipal system later. The use of outside sewer fees 
to pay for the expansion of sewers within the city also neglected Phoenix’s inner city, 
46 
 
with privies prevalent into the 1960s. A 1965 study of a 33 square mile area of the inner 
city revealed nearly 800 privies in use.
81
 
 Phoenix officials dealt with the sanitary problems in outlying areas in part through 
aggressive annexation policies, whereby areas on the outskirts of the city became part of 
the city’s official limits, which compelled areas to connect to the city’s sewer system. 
The primary goal of annexation was to ensure orderly growth.
82
 Assistant City Manager 
Charles Esser recalled he and City Manager Ray Wilson “had to roughshod a few 
members of planning and finance because they wanted things paid for first,” but the 
council thought “that would be too late…that a ring of ‘bedroom’ towns would start to 
develop.”83 From 1950 to 1960, Phoenix grew from 17 to 187 square miles as the city’s 
population quadrupled. To help manage this growth, the city appointed John Burke 
Director of Annexation in 1950. Under Arizona law, a city could only annex an area with 
which it shared a border. The annexing municipality could initiate annexation or residents 
of the annex area could petition for annexation. Either way, success depended on a 
majority on the petition signed by “the owners of not less than one half in value of the 
real and personal property as would be subject to taxation by the city or town in the event 
of annexation.” Burke, along with other city officials, including Mayor Jack Wilson, 
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aggressively pursued annexation---producing videos and pamphlets, attending public 
meetings, and even using paid circulars to pitch the benefits of annexation.
84
  
 Efficient city services---fire, police, water, and sewer---were cornerstones of these 
campaigns and Phoenix often extended these services prior to annexation to make it more 
appealing to those on the fringe. Sanitary Districts often served this purpose. The city 
also annexed areas to increase their tax base, and prevent surrounding “satellite towns,” 
such as Tempe and Scottsdale, from limiting the spatial growth of Phoenix. Sometimes, 
this resulted in conflict, as Scottsdale and Phoenix both attempted to annex portions of 
the Paradise Valley in 1961, with the latter ultimately succeeding. Often, brochures 
compared the costs and quality of services outside with those within the city. One 
brochure entitled, “An Invitation to Become Part of the City of Phoenix,” promised that 
the annexed area would receive improved water and sewer service, and at lower rates, 
plus a variety of public health services. Annexation was a strategy common to growing 
western cities, such as Albuquerque and Tucson, but faced resistance from people that 
wanted to avoid higher taxes. In Phoenix, the campaigns enjoyed tremendous success, 
and faced little organized resistance. The majority of annexation petitions between 1950 
and 1965 received well over the 50% requirement, with most close to sixty percent. In 
1960, 75% of people in the City of Phoenix lived in areas annexed in previous decade.
85
 
                                                          
84
 Ibid, Table 5.  For more on the annexation process and logic guiding Phoenix officials, see ibid, 42-
43,67-70 and 97-100. The specific quote regarding the petition can be found on page 43. For the 1960 
population statistic, see iv-v. Carollo also notes that the extension of sewers “helps simplify the problems 
of future annexations which are bound to occur as long as Phoenix continues to develop.” See Sewerage, 
39. 
85Examples of brochures from annexation campaigns can be found in Michael Konig, “Toward 
Metropolitan Status: Charter Government and the Rise of Phoenix, Arizona, 1945-1960,” (PhD. diss., 
Arizona State University, 1983), 98-99. The annexation approval figures come from Wenum, Annexation 
as a Technique for Metropolitan Growth, Table 18, page 62. The lowest approval rating was 52.58% while 
48 
 
 
Figure 4. Phoenix’s Growth Through Annexation.86 
 In 1953, following the sanitary engineering report, David Campbell, Chairman of 
Phoenix Sanitary District #1, proposed integrating the District with the city sewer system 
to Phoenix Mayor Hohen Foster and the Phoenix City Council. This area included many 
affluent subdivisions adjacent the base of Camelback Mountain who could afford the 
higher user fees. In his letter, Campbell cited the engineering report and noted a “mutual 
problem…to provide adequate sewer service.” He proposed extending sewer services to 
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make annexation easier later and explained that annual rental fees would more than repay 
the cost of extending lines. Similarly, the other abutting area to the north of the city 
formed a sanitary district and asked for integration into Phoenix’s sewer system. Phoenix 
agreed. Funding the project remained the last hurdle.
87
 
 Multiple bond issues supported municipal sewer projects. City officials pitched 
the bonds as a vote for a “coordinated, integrated community plan, which will do away 
with the cesspool menace.” Moreover, city officials argued the city needed “a modern 
sewer system to protect the health of children…and to provide for the future” growth of 
the city. David Campbell appeared on the radio to make the case for Sanitary District #1. 
Radio advertisements in 1954 specifically referenced the city’s high infant mortality rate 
and noted the threat of water contamination from malfunctioning septic tanks and 
cesspools. These advertisements reflected the findings of the Carollo report as well as a 
1954 public health survey. The city asked the Public Health Director to conduct a survey 
of the southwestern area of the city, which found one place where a privy served the 
needs of three different families. In short, the survey found many places “just right for fly 
breeding and disease transmission.” Additionally, the city promised that the bond issue 
would not raise taxes because new customer fees would offset the costs of expansion.
88
   
 Phoenix voters overwhelmingly supported the expansion of the municipal sewer 
system, voting in favor of the bonds by a ratio of two to one. Opposition came almost 
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entirely from districts south of Van Buren, where those living in multifamily housing 
feared higher taxes. These districts contained large portions of the city’s minority 
populations and remained largely in opposition to future sewer bonds. Nonetheless, the 
bonds provided over $3 million to sewer both sanitary districts and parts of Phoenix, 
including areas near Van Buren.
89
  
 The state, as well as the cities in the metropolitan area took advantage of federal 
legislation to expand their human capital. First, the Arizona Health Department’s Bureau 
of Sanitation used federal funds to establish a water pollution control section within the 
Bureau, with regional offices in each county. In 1956, the County Health Department 
expanded to include fifteen sanitarians, “to the end that a more realistic attack might be 
made on our environmental health problems.”90 The following year, the Maricopa County 
Health Department, who aided the FHA and VA in inspecting septic systems in homes 
sponsored by those agencies, created its first planned and integrated environmental 
sanitation services that year in a division of sanitation. Moreover, the Department 
established a training program for sanitarians.
91
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 In 1957, the City and County Health Departments merged to consolidate 
sanitation efforts and more efficiently address problems. The merger transferred City 
employees to the County, which assumed responsibility for all sanitary inspections, while 
the Phoenix Division of Water and Sewers received Departmental status to accommodate 
the city’s growing population the following year. The municipal reorganization moved 
one-fifth of the city’s two-thousand employees to this Department, demonstrating the 
importance of sanitation services to the city’s growth. Moreover, it demonstrates how 
environmental and public health values reshaped metropolitan political institutions. 
Collaborative and more expansive efforts continued to shape government officials’ 
responses to shared sanitary problems, but soon efforts focused on planning for growth, 
rather than responding to it. These measures mark the acknowledgement of countywide 
sanitation problems and the first steps toward the creation of a comprehensive, 
metropolitan area sanitation program. In the coming years, the metropolitan area cities 
increasingly coordinated their sanitation efforts.
92
   
 
Towards a Regional Approach: Phoenix and Glendale, 1957-1961  
 Phoenix and other metropolitan area cities sought out federal funds under the 
1956 Water Pollution Control Act. Phoenix and Glendale city councils met throughout 
1956 and 1957, and agreed to construct a joint-sewage treatment plant in March of 1957. 
Phoenix and Glendale both sought to finance the construction of the 91
st
 Avenue 
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Wastewater Treatment Plant and an extension of sewer lines through bond elections, as 
well as federal funds from the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act. Phoenix received 
$180,000 while Glendale received $105,730 from the federal government. Glendale 
voters approved a $1.5 million sewer and water bond by a margin of four to one. In 
Phoenix, the $14 million sewer bond issue largely reflected the recommendations of the 
Phoenix Growth Committee (PGC), a group of over four hundred citizens. The PGC 
mostly consisted of businessmen and civic leaders representing banks, real estate 
developers, pipefitting companies, General Electric and other engineering firms, and 
plumbing suppliers.
93
  
 PGC urged voters to approve the bonds, making over seventy-five speeches to 
business, citizen, and church groups throughout the city. In their presentation to the 
Phoenix city council, Water and Sewer Divisions Chairman Alfred Rasor, a prominent 
real estate executive, explained the bonds were needed to meet the needs of a growing 
population, and the city “must not…dare not” let the city continue to grow and “deny 
those people the protection of an adequate sanitary sewer system.” The bonds faced no 
organized opposition. Voters approved the sewer bond proposal by a margin of two and a 
half to one, demonstrating widespread appeal for sewer expansion. Following the public 
vote in May, the Citizen’s Bond Advisory Committee of the PGC approved a budget plan 
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developed by John Carollo Engineers in December. The cities shared the costs of 
construction equally, and divided operation costs based on the proportion of flows from 
each area.
94
 
 Following construction of the plant, Phoenix and Glendale made efforts to 
connect as many people as possible in the westerly lying areas to the municipal sewer 
system, which now included the five million gallons per day capacity of the 91
st
 Avenue 
Sewage Treatment Plant. This encompassed an area demarcated by the Black Canyon 
Highway on the east, 43
rd
 avenue on the west, and between Olive Road to the north and 
Thomas Road to the south.
95
 Phoenix used the bonds to expand the sewer service area 
from 33 square miles to 195 square miles and provided service to an estimated 25,000 
people, most of whom lived outside the city limits for the time being, as Phoenix annexed 
many of these areas in the following years. In Maryvale alone, municipal sewers 
prevented the installation of or replaced over 5,500 septic tanks.
96
 The widespread and 
overwhelming support for such measures demonstrate the high value the public placed on 
sanitary conditions as a key component of their quality of living. Phoenix Mayor Jack 
Williams optimistically explained that the bond election put Phoenix “in a position where 
it can catch up with its growth.” While extending sewer lines, Phoenix continued its 
aggressive annexation campaign, absorbing large portions to the south, west and 
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northeast into the city. These areas included Maryvale, South Phoenix, and Sunnyslope, 
bringing over 100,000 people into the city limits, which required connection to municipal 
sewers. In 1959 and 1960, the city expanded its borders by almost 135 square miles. 
Despite these tremendous efforts by the city, many of the cities in the metropolitan area, 
including Phoenix, quickly outgrew their sewage treatment facilities due to “increased 
subdivision development.”97  
 The 91
st
 Avenue Plant provided much needed relief for Phoenix and Glendale, 
“alleviating public health problems in the area” while making good on CGC’s promise of 
efficiency, saving the two cities’ money they otherwise would have spent on separate 
treatment plants. W.A. Gilchrist believed that with 91
st
 Avenue online, “the septic tank 
and cesspool problem should be a thing of the past and the pollution of highly valued 
ground water stopped...within a few years.” Still, problems persisted into the 1960s in 
Phoenix and elsewhere.
98
  
 In 1959, the city commissioned yet another report on its sewage system. Like 
studies earlier in the decade, the 1959 City of Phoenix Sanitary Sewer Report by Yost and 
Gardner Engineers argued for the need to replace septic tanks and cesspools with 
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expanded municipal sewer system. The Report also highlighted the growth of 
subdivisions near Phoenix’s fringe, such as Westtown, Village Meadows, Moon Valley, 
South Phoenix and Country Club
 
 near Deer Valley, as well as growth in the Town of 
Paradise Valley, Peoria, Youngtown, and Del Webb’s master planned retirement 
community, Sun City. A successful bond election in 1961, whose proposal originated 
with Yost and was endorsed by the PGC, would help bring many of these areas, including 
vast portions of Paradise Valley; northwestern areas around Phoenix, and South Phoenix 
into the Phoenix metropolitan sewer system and eventually much of these areas were 
annexed in the early 1960s. Between 1958 through 1961, Phoenix installed 354.63 miles 
of sewer lines.
99
 
 The Yost study noted that at its current capacity of five million gallons per day, 
urban growth would overload the 91
st
 Avenue Plant by 1962. In Phoenix and elsewhere, 
suburban growth continued to outpace the provision of adequate sewage treatment. “The 
major groundwater contamination problem,” noted a nationwide study undertaken by the 
American Waste Water Association, “resulted from construction of housing 
developments in which each dwelling is serviced by its individual well and sewage 
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disposal system.” Phoenix Mayor Sam Mardian described the 91st Avenue Plant as a 
model for future joint projects for both its efficiency in treating sewage and cost-
effectiveness. In June of 1961, the five major cities in the metropolitan area---Phoenix, 
Scottsdale, Tempe, Mesa, and Glendale---began discussing such a project.
100
 
 
Shared problems, Shared Solutions: Metropolitan Sewage Treatment  
 Beginning in the summer of 1961, the cities convened to discuss the problem of 
sewage treatment and disposal in the area, although cooperation between municipal 
entities and suburban areas was nothing new. Historian Sarah Elkind described a similar 
process of regionalism and the creation of metropolitan authorities that increased 
coordination between urban areas and their surrounding suburbs during the Progressive 
Era in Boston and the California Bay Area to deal with water contamination problems.
101
 
In the Valley of the Sun, regional meetings focused on the expansion of the 91
st
 Avenue 
Plant, and the necessary trunk lines, to serve the metropolitan area cities’ mutual needs. 
In August 1961, the Phoenix City Council adopted a resolution expressing approval of a 
cooperative effort to establish a joint sewage disposal system for the five cities in order to 
“solve possible contamination and health problems” from improper sewage disposal. On 
August 8, 1962, the Scottsdale City Council passed Resolution 213. The Resolution noted 
that the five cities faced “common and similar problems relating to sewage disposal 
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systems and provision for effluent waters” and committed Scottsdale to working toward a 
regional solution. These remarks followed a published study of the Salt River Valley’s 
rapidly growing cities. The report argued that “ineffectual protection to public health is 
provided by the individual waste disposal units in the large unsewered communities” like 
Scottsdale. Moreover, individual sewage disposal units threatened “underground waters, 
and in densely populated areas, the same water strata into which the wastes are 
discharged may be tapped for domestic or irrigation.” At the same time, a sanitary report 
of Tempe noted that rapid growth resulted in many areas of the city served “by means of 
substandard, temporary, and in some cases uneconomical means.”102  
 As metropolitan area cities sought a comprehensive sewer system, the Arizona 
Legislature adopted new standards in 1962 for septic tanks modeled off the USPHS 
Manual for Septic Tank Practice. The new standards created stringent requirements that 
sought to limit the use of septic tanks, but left significant discretion to local and county 
health departments. The standards listed a number of conditions where septic tanks or 
individual sewage disposal would not receive approval, which largely relied on health 
departments to decide where connecting to a pubic sewage system was “practical.” 
Moreover, the bulletin included a number of best practices to prevent problems such as 
those highlighted by the Maricopa Health Department. These included design 
recommendations and installation requirements, such as the distance between the home 
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and the septic system, as well as between the septic tank and leaching field, and 
minimum requirements for tank size.
103
 
 Mesa’s city council authorized the project and held a successful bond election in 
1962, while Tempe approved the project in November of 1963. By July 18, 1963, all the 
cities had approved the project and secured enough local money to supplement federal 
funds necessary to expand the plant. Like the earlier agreement between Phoenix and 
Glendale, the Joint Sewer Agreement divided construction costs equally among the cities, 
but shared operation costs proportionate to their contracted flow. Again, federal dollars 
from the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act, whose maximum contribution increased to 
$600,000 due to a 1961 amendment, helped pay for construction costs. Phoenix received 
the maximum allowable funds, the largest construction grant in the city’s history at that 
point. The cities added three units capable of treating 15 million gallon per day, bringing 
the plant’s capacity to 45 million gallons per day, which could serve the metropolitan 
area for over a decade. In November of 1965, it began doing so.
104
 
 
 
Coda: Sanitary Success, but Continuing Challenges   
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 By 1968, three-quarters of the Phoenix metropolitan area enjoyed the benefits of 
municipal sewers, with only several small towns like El Mirage, Surprise, Peoria, and 
Youngtown largely unsewered. While unconnected, the towns had reached agreements to 
connect with the 91
st
 Avenue Plant in the future.
105
 The precedent set in the 1950s, of 
expanding the sewer system outward as the city grew continued through the 1960s and 
subsequent decades. From 1959 to 1968, the city increased the number of sewer taps by 
185%, the size of the service by 316%, and the miles of sewer line by 192%.
106
 The 
expansion of this system and the consolidation of the Phoenix metropolitan area’s sewage 
in centralized treatment plants has remained the focal point of urban policy regarding 
wastewater management as they have sought to stay ahead of growth. Two more 
additions to the plant, in 1969 and 1975, brought its total capacity to 95 million gallons 
per day. In April 1975, voters in Phoenix approved the sale of $30 million in general 
obligation bonds to finance sanitary sewer system improvements, which in addition to 
expanding the 91
st
 Avenue Plan also extended municipal sewer connections to serve Deer 
Valley, North Phoenix, and the town of Paradise Valley. A number of additional 
expansions over the next three decades brought the plant’s capacity to 230 million 
gallons today.
107
 
 The collaborative efforts of municipal and state officials, along with funds from 
the federal government, created a metropolitan sanitary sewer system that spared Phoenix 
residents the most serious consequences of communicable disease from human waste. 
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Top-down reform, driven by municipal and industry experts, continued to characterize 
wastewater management policy, but the public also continued to support the efforts. 
Municipal officials appealed to concern over public health and disease, which provided 
the justification for constructing and expanding the municipal sewer system. In the 1950s, 
the public expressed their environmental concerns repeatedly in bond elections and 
through participatory governance, like the Phoenix Growth Committee and the formation 
of Sanitary Districts.  
 Concern over water supply resulted in agreements intended to conserve water. 
Agreements transferred treated effluent from the 91
st
 Avenue Plant to other uses in the 
metropolitan area, but followed guidelines set forth in the 1972 Clean Water Act, and 
subsequent amendments. Some effluent goes to agriculture fields on the outskirts of 
Phoenix, such the Buckeye irrigation district west of the city.  Other effluent is 
discharged into riparian and wildlife areas, such as the Base and Meridian Wildlife area 
where rare bird species such as Virginia rail find a home. More recently, effluent from 
91
st
 Avenue Plant helped create the Tres Rios Wetlands, which became home to a wide 
variety of plant and animal life. Another agreement began in 1973 sends effluent to the 
Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in the nation, where it cools reactors that 
generate electricity for the metropolitan area and larger Southwest. In 2011, the city 
announced its goal of reusing 100% of the wastewater from the plant. While the plant has 
increased its capacity to meet the needs of a growing population, and found ways to put 
wastewater to reuse, the construction of permanent, inflexible infrastructure is not 
without its drawbacks. By the 1960s, the limitation of this infrastructure became 
61 
 
apparent. Mark Hollis, Assistant Surgeon General and Chief Engineer of the USPHS 
explained that the cleanliness of the nation’s drinking waters depended on whether one 
included new toxic chemical contaminants. Then and now, this infrastructure lacks the 
ability to deal with new water pollution threats from nonpoint sources, mostly inorganic, 
such as the increased use of chemical pesticides, and agriculture runoff.
108
  
 The infrastructure may not adequately meet the new challenges that emerged in 
the 1960s and have continued to pollute the nation’s water supplies, but the collaborative 
efforts of multiple levels of government provides an important framework from which 
solutions may arise. Perhaps the most important lesson lies in the pragmatism and 
cooperation between municipal governments to find solutions to shared, complex urban 
problems. It also highlights the precarious balancing act municipal leaders walked in 
promoting growth, while also seeking to manage its unintended consequences. Moreover, 
these efforts did little to prevent or slow suburban sprawl, but instead accommodated it. 
During this time, metropolitan leaders or technical experts never discussed the reduction 
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of waste. They only sought ways to accommodate more of it. The latticework of sewer 
lines crisscrossed further and further out into the desert.  
 Much of the sanitary infrastructure, however, would not have been possible 
without aid from the federal government, which would continue to play an important role 
in shaping Phoenix and providing funds to solve environmental problems shared by cities 
across the nation. As metropolitan centers grew after World War II, the shared 
environment became a common concern and played an important role in urban planning. 
The values of the open space movement and preservation of mountain areas in Phoenix 
followed a different pattern, a more bottom-up approach to environmental policy-making. 
The visible deterioration of the environment rallied the public to demand their 
government do more to carefully consider additional values in urban planning: aesthetics 
and recreation.  
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CHAPTER 3: A Mountain in a Sea of Sprawl: Preserving Phoenix’s Camelback 
Mountain, 1954-1973  
 
 The campaign to preserve Camelback Mountain, Phoenix’s most iconic landmark, 
demonstrates the irony of suburban development. Just as the pastoral appeal of suburban 
living, with its appreciation of scenic mountain landscapes, both for aesthetics and 
recreation, brought people to Phoenix, it also engendered a backlash against development 
in outlying areas. Suburban growth helped create the conditions that framed the open 
space movement, spawned in the postwar environment of booming economic growth and 
home ownership. The movement’s resistance to unrestrained growth was rooted in local 
environmental concerns for protecting the city’s mountainous areas---symbols of quality 
of life and identity---from residential development. The fact that both the growth of the 
suburbs and the preservation of open spaces relied upon federal funds meant that the 
federal government, so essential to Phoenix’s growth, would continue to play a 
commanding role in shaping the city. The tension among growing suburbs, private 
property rights and the preservation of open spaces, personified by the quest to preserve 
Camelback Mountain, remains an important issue to contemporary debates about urban 
growth. Efforts in community organization and outreach in the 1950s and 1960s to save 
Camelback provide lessons for the present. By the 1970s, open spaces were a cornerstone 
of the city’s urban planning. 
 Like many cities after World War II, the population of Phoenix and its physical 
boundaries exploded. Many came to the suburbs in part to be closer to nature.
109
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Throughout the 1950s, cities and suburbs around the nation consumed a piece of land the 
size of Rhode Island from the countryside.
110
 At the same time, the ecological, social, and 
aesthetic value of open space, popularized by social critics like William Whyte, became 
part of the national debate about urban growth.
111
 Open space activists employed three 
kinds of arguments: 1) conservation, 2) outdoor recreation, and 3) aesthetic. The postwar 
growth of cities like Phoenix left many people concerned, as bulldozers transformed 
diverse ecosystems---hillsides, forests, prairie, wetlands, and deserts---into homogenous, 
characterless strips of commercial and residential development. This environmentalism 
did not arise from some abstract philosophy; it involved places people knew intimately 
and that embodied values that became a part of the community’s identity.112 
 Over time, residents wove the mountains surrounding the city into the cultural and 
social fabric with which they identified themselves as Phoenicians. When developers 
began transforming open desert and mountain spaces into strip malls and housing, some 
residents became alarmed. Camelback quickly became the source of legend, poems, 
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photography, stories, and pride for Phoenicians—in short, something they cared deeply 
about and would lobby their elected officials to protect.
113
 
 The mountain itself belonged not to the city, but instead to numerous private 
individuals. In this way, the burgeoning sprawl that characterized postwar Phoenix 
affected Camelback as well. As open space preservation became a component of urban 
planning in the 1950s and 1960s, government officials struggled to balance the promotion 
of economic growth with a public desire for natural areas within the city. Historian 
Samuel Hays argued that the urban fringe nurtured “many ideas about environmental 
quality, support for environmental organizations, and political action.”114 The suburbs 
became a conflict zone between development and environmental concerns. With little 
experience in open-space preservation, municipal officials initially responded without a 
well-developed strategic plan, as they attempted to balance private property and public 
interests. In the subsequent struggle, community activists promoted the mountain’s 
aesthetic and recreational value. Camelback was part of many Phoenicians’ everyday 
lives: a view they enjoyed on their ride to work or while relaxing in their yard; a place 
where they picnicked, hiked, or rode horses. In short, it was the place that people most 
identified with the city they called home. It ultimately would require mobilization of the 
city elite and other community members, federal funds, and a political commitment to 
secure Camelback as open space and to save the mountain from the developer’s 
bulldozer.  
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Origins: The Birth of a Mountain and a Movement  
 The Camel emerged 1.7 billion years ago, when two subterranean plates collided 
and initiated the transformation of molten rock into granite. Seismic activity over the next 
billion years thrust parts of the rock upward, with the greatest upheaval creating a 2,704-
foot peak, taller than any other peak in the surrounding area. From its summit, the entire 
Valley unfolds below, just as the Camel’s hump is within view from anywhere on the 
valley floor. Located just seven miles from downtown Phoenix near the border of 
Scottsdale, and Paradise Valley, the mountain affords city and suburban dwellers access 
to aesthetic beauty and recreation within the city’s limits. Before Phoenix’s founding, the 
mountain served as a sacred ceremonial center, a connection between heaven and earth, 
for the Salt River Valley’s indigenous population, including the Hohokam and, later, the 
Salt River Pima and Maricopa Indians. In 1879, President Rutherford B. Hayes ordered 
an expansion of the Salt-River Pima Reservation that completely engulfed the land 
containing Camelback. After lobbying from the Arizona territorial legislature, Congress 
reduced the size of the reservation, transferring Camelback and much of the current 
Phoenix metropolitan area to the Arizona territory. The territory sold some parcels of 
land to private citizens before its statehood in 1912, but the state stepped up the pace after 
Arcadia Water Company dug a well and built a pipeline near the mountain in 1919.
115
  
 Scenic areas attract people. Camelback was no exception. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
people rode horses and picnicked with family and friends in the mountain’s shadow. By 
1960, the state and private developers sold, resold, and subdivided almost all the land on 
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Camelback. Developers built luxury resorts, like the Camelback Inn, near the base of the 
mountain to cater to winter visitors from the frigid northeast or Midwest. By 1960, 
snowbirds enjoyed numerous nesting options; eleven resorts surrounded the mountain.  
Meanwhile, wealthy businessmen and professionals flocked to adjacent residential and 
prestigious neighborhoods, such as the city of Paradise Valley and the Arcadia 
Residential District. In 1960, a home near the mountain cost on average $34,583, at a 
time when the average home price elsewhere in Phoenix cost $13,980.
116
 Even so, the 
population adjacent the mountain, bounded by Scottsdale Road on the east, 55
th
 Street on 
the west, McDonald Road on the north, and the Arizona Canal to the south nearly 
doubled between 1960 and 1965. People valued the mountain, and expressed those values 
through a willingness to pay, assuming they could afford it, two and a half times more for 
a home near the mountain than elsewhere.
 
As the population at the mountain’s base grew, 
people went to even greater lengths in search of aesthetic beauty and recreation. Up the 
mountain, homes climbed.
117
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Figure 5. Suburban Development around Camelback Mountain, 1900 to 1979. This image 
shows the increased suburban development around Camelback Mountain.
118
 
 
 As more homes dotted the slopes of the mountain the Maricopa County 
government moved to expand its park and open space lands. As a precedent, it looked to 
the 1924 acquisition of South Mountain, which the city purchased for $17,000 from the 
federal government; at nearly 16,000 acres, it is one of the largest municipal parks in the 
nation. In 1954, the County government purchased from the federal government a 250-
acre tract adjacent to 400 acres of land already leased from the state, which served as the 
foundation of Estrella Mountain Park west of the City. Improvements, including a 
softball diamond, outdoor fireplaces, and ramadas, soon followed. The county also 
expanded parkland to the northeast of Phoenix. In 1954, the county purchased 275 acres 
of land previously used as a campground for the Phoenix Indian School for North 
Mountain Park. Two years later the County acquired Squaw Peak from the state.
119
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 The city, on the other hand struggled to provide adequate parks for the booming 
population, which grew from 65,414 in 1940 to 106,818 in 1950. Phoenix added only ten 
acres of parks from 1945 to 1948, at a time when developers subdivided 5,280 acres of 
land for housing. Although the city passed several bond measures in subsequent years, it 
failed to convert money into comprehensive action, instead purchasing several small lots 
for neighborhood park development, including softball fields and playgrounds. 
Camelback Mountain remained in private hands and subject to suburban development.
120
 
 By 1954, the increasingly crowded Valley floor near Camelback had pushed 
homes upward to the 1,600-foot mark, only 1,000 feet from the summit. In response, 
local residents formed the Camelback Improvement Association (CIA), with its goal to 
preserve the remaining undeveloped parts of the mountain in its “natural state.” The CIA 
acted as a watchdog and liaison between developers and the county planning 
commission, as builders continued to seek approval for construction of homes above 
1,600-feet. C. Tim Rogers met a storm of resistance in 1954, when he proposed the first 
subdivision above 1,600-feet and began constructing roads prior to gaining county 
approval. E.B. Myrick spoke on behalf of the CIA, decrying the construction of homes 
and roads, which he said would “utterly destroy its beauty.”  
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Figure 6. The Maricopa County Park System.
121
 
 Two local women, Louise Woolsey and R.C. Saddler, who both lived on the 
southern slope of Camelback, spearheaded CIA publicity efforts. Woolsey and Saddler 
circulated petitions and lobbied city and county officials to pass zoning regulations 
prohibiting development on the mountain. Casey Abbott, Chairman of the Maricopa 
County Planning and Zoning Commission (MCPZC), proved a sympathetic ally to the 
conservation cause. Although the commission acted only in an advisory role to the county 
board of supervisors, and had no legal authority to enforce or even create a law 
preventing development, Abbott delayed development proposals, ostensibly citing 
sanitation and safety reasons. The delay provided time for conservationists to organize.
122
 
 After a bulldozer graded a road above 1,600-feet in 1957, Woolsey helped bring 
together at least one representative from each of thirty different Valley garden clubs to 
raise support for protecting the mountain. In April of 1959, she presented twenty petitions 
from various organizations urging the planning commission to do more to stop 
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development on Camelback. “The characteristic silhouette of Camelback has stood for 
millions of years,” she reminded commissioners, “it scarcely seems that it should be the 
privilege of this generation to disfigure and destroy it.” Abbott’s stall tactics could only 
last so long though. Slowly, homes and roads continued to carve into the mountain. Yet, 
MCPZC’s inability to protect the mountain only invigorated and expanded preservation 
efforts. Phoenicians, as they had in the past, turned to the federal government for help.
123
 
 
How to Save the Hump: Lobbying for Federal Legislation  
 In 1960, concern about Camelback, along with other conservation issues brought 
together community councils from Phoenix and Tucson, with representatives of 
conservation groups throughout Arizona. During a meeting at the Phoenix Public Library, 
they discussed the formation of a statewide organization to pursue conservation goals. 
The conclave spawned the Arizona Conservation Council (ACC), representing a diverse 
coalition of sixteen groups that included the Arizona Game Protective Association, the 
Arizona Federation of Women’s Clubs, the State Parks Association, as well as groups 
representing birdwatchers, yachtsmen, campers, and photographers. Preserving 
Camelback was near the top of its agenda. The ACC envisioned a two-part plan to protect 
the mountain: guard the 1,600-foot line, at the time the highest point of development, 
until the Council figured out some way to return the mountain to public ownership. This 
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large and diverse coalition concentrated their efforts on negotiating with private 
landowners and pressuring elected government officials.
124
 
 As conservationists fought to protect Camelback, Phoenix built on the earlier 
efforts of Maricopa County to expand the park system. The county agreed to lease land 
on Squaw Peak and North Mountain to the city in 1960, but the city’s efforts to expand 
the park area faced opposition from mining interests that claimed the mountain might 
contain valuable minerals. Judicial decisions eventually resolved this issue in favor of the 
city, and in 1968, Mayor Milton Graham dedicated the new city parks. This success 
represents a very different situation from the one facing Camelback, as the county or state 
owned almost all the land in question, rather than private homeowners. While Phoenix 
compared favorably to other cities in terms of acres of parkland, this was mostly 
attributable to the city’s acquisition of South Mountain Park. Phoenix still lacked a 
comprehensive park system.
125
   
 Following World War II, a Public Administration Service (PAS) report 
recommended that Phoenix develop a parks plan to meet the demand for recreation. Over 
the next few years, the city worked in a piecemeal fashion, developing different 
recreation spaces throughout the city. In 1945, it bought a pair of parks from the Phoenix 
Elementary School District and purchased a strip of land to round out the borders of 
Encanto Park, near 15
th
 Avenue, in central Phoenix. The following year, the city built a 
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4,500-seat softball park. By 1948, the city parks board developed a plan that reflected the 
PAS recommendations. Utilizing bond issues in subsequent years, by the early 1950s, the 
parks board developed new parks, baseball fields, and golf courses, as well as a nighttime 
recreation program consisting of supervised activities. The increasing interest in city 
parks made Camelback’s lack of protection all the more salient.126  
 The ACC tirelessly tried to forge a compromise with Camelback property owners. 
In 1961, roughly one-half the property owners, who held two-thirds of the acreage, 
expressed a willingness to either sell the land at market value or trade their Camelback 
property for other equally valuable land elsewhere. John McChesney spoke on behalf of 
the group, explaining the property owners felt the idea of gifting land to the city to be an 
“insult;” but they “would probably be willing to make the trade” at the right price. 
McChesney estimated the value of the land to be worth $2.5 million. Although ACC 
chair Odd Halseth acknowledged that “private property is sacred” and stated that the 
ACC had worked to determine a fair price. The prohibitive figure quoted by McChesney 
led the ACC to promote the idea of trading public land for the Camelback properties. 
They began lobbying local congressional representatives to take action.
127
  
 Community pressure organized by the ACC produced draft legislation. On March 
26, 1962, U.S. Congressman John Rhodes of Mesa introduced House Resolution 10922.  
The product of collaboration between Rhodes and the ACC, with the ACC providing 
maps and a list of Camelback property owners, the proposed legislation sought 
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authorization to exchange federal lands for land on Camelback in order to protect the area 
on Camelback above 1,600 feet from development. Rhodes received numerous letters of 
support from members of the community who lamented recent construction and hoped it 
was not too late to preserve the mountain.
128
 
 Secretary of the Interior and Arizona native Stewart Udall noted how residential 
subdivisions spreading from the city center posed the main threat to the mountaintop. 
Nevertheless, Udall opposed the bill, “Because of the location we believe the local 
community”---and not the federal government---“should be encouraged to preserve the 
mountain top in some form for public use,” he argued.129 The bill failed to leave the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
130
 A similar bill, introduced by Barry 
Goldwater and Carl Hayden in the U.S. Senate the following year, similarly faltered in 
committee, as the number of landowners above 1,600-feet grew to seventy-three.
131
 
Failed efforts to pass federal legislation forced the ACC to turn its efforts to the state 
level, where stronger support existed to preserve the local landmark.  
 
An Appeal to Arizonans: Trying for State Legislation    
 On February 1, 1963, Isabel Burgess, John Pritzlaff, and John Reese introduced 
House Bill 312, which proposed authorizing the state land commissioner to exchange 
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state owned lands for the properties above the 1,600-foot mark on Camelback. The 
legislation attempted to circumvent a state law that prohibited the disbursement of state 
land, except through public auction or trade with the federal government, by proposing to 
preserve the acquired land as a state landmark managed by the state parks board.  
Governor Fannin, the ACC, the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, and Arizona’s 
congressional delegation, as well as community organizations, local businesses, and 
school groups all expressed support for the bill. The House sent the bill to committee for 
discussion.
132
  
 In October of 1963, a student at Phoenix’s Arcadia High School initiated a 
grassroots teenage campaign that hoped to “succeed where their parents have failed.” 
Shari Hume, editor of the school paper, drew up a petition on behalf of “The young 
people of Arizona” urging “the State Legislature of the State of Arizona to take 
appropriate action to permanently preserve Camelback Mountain in its present state for 
the viewing pleasure of future generations.”133 A running tally compiled by the Arizona 
Republic revealed that, while schools nearest Camelback, such as Camelback and 
Arcadia high schools, accounted for 72% of all signatures, students from as far away as 
Tucson, Tolleson, and Duncan had also rallied to the cause. The petition circulated 
around Arcadia’s campus and soon spread to other Valley schools. At Representative 
Burgess’s invitation, Hume and more than one hundred other students presented the 
petition at the State Capitol. Afterward, they gathered on the Capitol lawn and unrolled 
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the petition---more than 300 feet long and bearing the names of 12,679 students---for the 
press.
134
  
 Public concern increased that same month, when Mr. and Mrs. Carruth, 
Camelback property owners, tried to blast an 18,000-pound boulder away from his home 
near the Camel’s head. In the end, the seventy sticks of dynamite generated more 
momentum to save the mountain than it did to move the actual boulder, which shifted 
only four inches. An angry editorial in the Republic fumed, “First the ear, then the 
humps, and then the tail, and finally the camel will be no more.” The community 
anxiously followed the course of the bill in the Arizona legislature.
135
  
 The fate of House Bill 312 lay in the hands of the Judiciary, Livestock and Public 
Lands subcommittee. Despite widespread community support, powerful interest groups 
in the state opposed the measure. The Arizona Education Association (AEA), ranchers 
and agricultural interests lobbied state legislators and pressured State Land Commissioner 
O.M. Lassen to keep state lands in trust, so they could later be used for “productive” 
purposes. The State Land Commission’s advisory committee featured prominent 
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representatives from each of these interest groups, who also advised Lassen to oppose the 
proposed legislation—which he did.136 
 The AEA, in particular, vehemently opposed HB 312 because revenue generated 
from public land leases provided an essential revenue stream for public schools in the 
state. They explained that, although they did not oppose Camelback preservation per se, 
the proposed “bill…would involve trading productive state school land for an 
unproductive scenic mountain.” AEA representatives objected to the enormous cost of 
buying land at the top of Camelback and argued that the proposed land swap violated 
state law, which stipulated that state lands be held in trust and could not be sold or leased, 
in whole or part, except to the highest bidder at public auction. The AEA pressured 
Waldo DeWitt, chair of the Livestock and Public Lands Committee, who helped keep the 
bill from reaching the House floor.
137
 
 
Grassroots: The Preservation of Camelback Mountain Foundation  
 Legislators’ inability to overcome the influence of important interest groups put 
the preservation of Camelback in a precarious position. Under the threat of imminent 
construction of new homes and roads, the effort to save Camelback shifted from the 
government to the public. In 1965, the Valley Beautiful Citizens Council (VBCC), whose 
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members comprised a “who’s who” of Phoenix, made preservation of Camelback its top 
agenda item. The VBCC’s most prominent members included City Council woman 
Margaret Kober; Henry Luce, the man behind the Time, Inc. publishing empire; Walter 
Bimson, President of Valley National Bank; and HB 312 sponsors Isabel Burgess and 
John Pritzlaff. Like similar groups nationwide, the VBCC concerned itself with 
preserving and enhancing their community’s aesthetics. Its members promoted green 
spaces and the planting of flowers, housing codes to ensure appealing neighborhoods, and 
a limitation on billboards that blocked scenic views. Through 1964 and 1965, the VBCC 
discussed the best way to protect Camelback, including lobbying Phoenix, Scottsdale, 
and Paradise Valley to pass strict zoning regulations and even purchasing the 
mountain.
138
 
 Many VBCC members lived near Camelback, and were concerned, like Margaret 
Kober, whose house was on the south side of the mountain, that their support would be 
“misinterpreted” as “trying to save [her] own backyard.” Henry Luce dismissed these 
doubts in an address to board members in early May. “If this organization shouldn’t be 
concerned with saving the likes of Camelback Mountain, then I don’t know why we 
exist,” he proclaimed. On May 10, 1965, VBCC announced the formation of the 
Preservation of Camelback Mountain Foundation (PCMF), a non-profit corporation 
comprised of the most prominent members of the group, including Kober, Luce, and 
senator and former presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. Kober and Goldwater wasted 
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no time before sending letters to friends and businesses asking for donations, and 
imploring property owners on Camelback to donate land. Meanwhile, PCMF Treasurer 
Harry Montgomery persuaded Phoenix City Manager Robert Coop to stymie 
development on Camelback by putting on hold applications to build on the mountain.
139
 
 The PCMF committed itself to acquiring the properties atop Camelback through 
tax-deductible land donations and by raising money to purchase land on the mountain, 
which the Foundation then planned to give to the city. The foundation drew the line of 
development at 1,800 feet. Two factors informed this decision. First, by concentrating on 
the land above 1,800 feet the foundation needed only to negotiate with twelve property 
owners, compared to at least seventy-three who held title to land above the 1,600-foot 
mark. Second, it allowed the foundation to preserve the silhouette of the mountain intact. 
Lewis Ruskin, the foundation’s chair, hoped that property owners “pride in their 
community…would be great enough that they would not seek an undue profit at the 
expense of the community.”140 By late October, Kober and Goldwater’s efforts had 
secured two tracts on the mountain and a promise from Elizabeth Arden, who owned 38 
acres on the eastside of the mountain, to leave her land undeveloped.
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 The PCMF launched their fund-raising campaign on October 26, 1965. At an 
event held in Camelback High School’s gymnasium, the foundation announced their 
intention to raise $300,000 to reclaim Camelback’s peak. They hoped to complete the 
purchase as a Christmas present to the City of Phoenix, an idea first suggested by Arizona 
Republic journalist Don Dedera, who also served as the master of ceremonies for the 
evening. The meeting drew over four hundred people, including members of thirty 
sportsmen’s clubs, a long list of garden and service clubs, as well as students and teachers 
from Valley high schools. Dedera’s opening remarks created a sense of urgency that 
other speeches built upon: “If we don’t save Camelback Mountain…our valley will lose 
its most important landmark.”142 Attendees next heard rousing speeches from Goldwater 
and Kober, who emphasized the importance of preserving a landmark “as significant to 
some people as the Grand Canyon.” Lewis Ruskin insisted that preserving Camelback 
was a critical milestone in Phoenicians’ quest to “grow, keep clean air, and a clean 
life.”143  
 The PCMF ideals echoed a growing national concern over the loss of open space. 
In 1963, President Kennedy urged the nation to “expand the concept of conservation” to 
meet the problems of the new age. Secretary of the Interior Udall, no doubt familiar with 
Phoenix’s impending challenges, went further: “Our cities have grown too fast to grow 
well, and today they are the focal point of the quiet crisis in conservation,” he wrote.144 
Arizona Governor Sam Goddard compared the effort to save Camelback with a “great 
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awakening” at “all levels of government and society…to the perils of loss of identity with 
the great natural backdrops.” In November 1965, Goddard formed the Governor’s 
Commission on Arizona Beauty, which emphasized the protection of air and water 
quality, along with the state’s scenic beauty. Legislation at the national and state level had 
failed to save the mountain, and so it turned to the local community, led by its most 
prominent members, to save their mountain.
145
 
 Goldwater, fresh from defeat in the 1964 Presidential campaign, devoted himself 
wholeheartedly to the campaign to preserve Camelback. Goldwater had grown up at the 
base of the mountain and memories from his childhood informed his love of the desert 
and mountain landscape, which fueled his devotion to the cause. He also concerned 
himself with the image of Arizona’s largest metropolitan center. “If we ruin Camelback,” 
Goldwater chided, “people will think of Phoenix as the city that made something ugly of 
the most beautiful thing it had.” Goldwater sent thousands of letters to his neighbors in 
Paradise Valley and Arcadia, soliciting donations and in-kind support from Valley 
businesses and community leaders. He helped convince local businesses to provide 
printed materials and legal services that minimized the costs of the campaign. These 
included Maricopa Printers, Don McGraw Printers, Arizona Messenger, Amy Chuka, and 
S.W. Envelope Company. Moreover, local hotels, ranchers, and motels enthusiastically 
donated to preserve a view that drew tourists to their doors. In an interview with Dedera, 
Goldwater confessed, “saving that mountain has become the most important goal of my 
life.”146 
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 The Pulliam newspapers provided persistent support. The shared downtown office 
of the Arizona Republic and Phoenix Gazette enjoyed a tremendous view of the mountain 
to the north---similar to the view the papers’ owner, Eugene Pulliam, appreciated from 
his backyard. From the launch of the campaign to December 25, the Republic and the 
Gazette produced no less than sixty-three articles, editorials, and cartoons that translated 
into daily coverage of the preservation effort. In addition, both papers published 
advertisements and information encouraging people to donate to the campaign. Republic 
cartoonist Reg Manning’s “Drowning Camel” image of the mountain surrounded by a sea 
of private development became a symbol featured on PCMF mailers. Individuals or 
groups that donated $10 or more received a commemorative certificate from the 
Republic.  While reporters and staff at both newspapers promoted preservation efforts, 
the campaign enjoyed no more exuberant media cheerleader than the Republic’s Don 
Dedera.
147
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Figure 7. Reg Manning’s “Drowing Camel” Cartoon. This cartoon became a widespread 
image for the campaign.
148
 
 
 Many Valley residents kept abreast of the latest news concerning the campaign to 
preserve Camelback by reading Dedera’s column, which provided a steady stream of 
cautious optimism. Dedera created a sense of drama around each moment; the fate of the 
mountain always jeopardized, yet in the capable hands of Valley residents. He 
characterized the preservation effort as something more important than just protecting a 
piece of land: “The influence of an unspoiled Camelback extends beyond resorts and 
neighborhoods on its slopes, beyond the cities around it, beyond the Salt River, and 
beyond the borders of Maricopa County,” he wrote. “A ruined Camelback would be the 
shame of Arizona.” Dedera also publicized fund-raising events and dedicated space in his 
column to Valley residents who supported the campaign, including the publication of a 
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flurry of letters. Shari Hume, the Arcadia High School student and leader of the teenage 
campaign, even appeared as a guest columnist. Dedera provided her with advice on 
organizing efforts.
149
  
 Other journalists also used their columns to support the campaign. Eleanor Shultz, 
editor of the Republic’s Home and Garden section, described the plight of the Camel 
facing the rising tide of suburban sprawl, “his eyelids heavy with houses.” Shultz 
implored residents of the Valley “to save him from the conquerors.” Robert Glasgow 
lamented the “homogenization of individual characteristics” created by sprawl, “the very 
things that make it possible for people to identify with where they live.” For many, 
Camelback Mountain was a defining moment in arresting the worst characteristics of 
urban sprawl.
150
 
 This point became clear in responses to PCMF requests for contributions. The 
foundation encouraged anyone who donated to attach a written message explaining the 
reason for his or her contribution. Nearly all the messages described specific personal 
experiences with the mountain that related at least one aspect of arguments commonly 
made on behalf of open spaces.  
 For some, the loss of the mountain meant the loss of recreation. They “grew up 
climbing” Camelback, which one respondent described as the “Alma Mater” of their 
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childhood. One elderly gentleman, who recalled fond memories of hiking and exploring 
the mountain, triumphantly declared, “this mountain is my mountain.” Climbers relished 
the mountain’s challenging rock face and proximity to downtown. Others lamented the 
potential loss of their favorite horse-riding venue, a popular activity dating back to the 
1930s and 1940s. Many noted Camelback as one of their favorite picnic areas, a place 
they escaped on holidays, birthdays, and dates.
151
 
 For some Phoenicians, the loss of the mountain meant the loss of scenic beauty. 
They contrasted Camelback’s natural beauty with suburban sprawl that many viewed as 
ugly and homogenous. They supported Camelback’s preservation because the mountain 
was “uniquely beautiful” and held inherent value---not in terms of dollars, but instead 
held in memories. For others, it represented more than just a mountain; its beauty offered 
a “source of inspiration.” The mountain also bestowed character on the city that set 
Phoenix apart from other communities. One woman explained, in a handwritten letter, 
that people “came far an’ near” to see Camelback, but if development continued, the 
mountain would look like “any other business district.”152 
 For some Phoenicians, the loss of the mountain meant the loss of habitual 
comfort. Whether driving to work or the first thing they “look[ed] at every morning,” 
they felt the view belonged to them. Recent arrivals found that the longer they lived in 
Phoenix, “the more we treasure our mountain.” Camelback Mountain had become “part 
of our everyday environment,” the Arcadia High School newspaper reflected, as it urged 
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students and faculty to support the cause.  Still others wanted “to keep Camelback free of 
more houses” because they believed it “the last barrier” protecting them from “highrise, 
glitter, and smog.” New immigrants, such as Phoenix Union High School superintendent 
Howard Seymour, adopted Camelback as a reliable landmark in an unfamiliar city; it 
became his favorite spot to take out-of-town visitors. Whatever their reasons, residents 
made it clear they did not want “to see old Camelback desecrated.”153 For each of them, 
the mountain meant something worth protection.  
 Meanwhile, Goldwater, Kober, and other PCMF members continued to negotiate 
with landowners on the mountain. A few, such as Robert Bayless and Lee Noble, donated 
their property to the foundation; however, they proved to be the exception and not the 
rule.
154
 Most owners wanted what they considered fair compensation on their investment. 
Charles Alberding, owner of the Jokake Inn and its forty-six acre plot, told Goldwater he 
would be “glad to trade the rump of Camel…for a dedicated horse trail around the 
mountain.” PCMF President Harry Coblentz contacted the State Parks Board as well as 
the Arizona Horsemen’s Association about the suitability of cutting a horse trail. A 
reconnaissance survey revealed an unstable terrain. More importantly, the city could not 
begin work on a trail until it actually possessed the mountain. This impasse stalled 
negotiations indefinitely between PCMF and Alberding.
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 In a series of letters between 1965 and 1966, Margaret Kober negotiated with 
Arizona Republic journalist Maggie Savoy a fair price for her land on Camelback 
Mountain. Initially, Kober asked her to donate the land in exchange for a tax credit, but 
the recently widowed Savoy explained herself incapable of working full time and 
described her financial condition as “not in the best health.” Savoy owned fourteen 
undeveloped acres of land on the mountain and hoped to gain more than just interest on 
the money she invested. Her asking price of $31,000, or ten percent of the foundation’s 
fundraising goal, seemed a high price in Kober’s eyes. Nevertheless, Kober persisted 
until she reached a satisfactory accommodation with Savoy a few months later. Similar 
negotiations took place with other property owners, who also sought a fair return on their 
investments.
156
  
 While PCMF members solicited donations and negotiated with Camelback 
property owners, Valley teenagers conducted their own campaign to preserve the 
mountain. They raised less money, but their efforts created great publicity. The teenagers 
organized a series of events that culminated in the Save Camelback Dance, one week 
before the Christmas deadline. In November, more than one hundred students from 
twenty-five high schools participated in fund-raising car washes throughout the Valley.
157
 
Valley high schools also competed in a “Cans for Camelback” contest sponsored by local 
radio station KRIZ. The Newell Salvage Company offered to pay twenty dollars per ton 
collected, with the school that collected the most winning a concert sponsored by the 
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radio station. The teenagers piled up over 14,500 pounds of cans into a half dozen six-by-
ten U-Haul trailers in the East Camelback Shopping Center parking lot. Camelback High 
School led the way and collected the prize. On December 18, Valley teenagers converged 
on the State Fairgrounds for a series of performances by rock-and-roll bands, enlivened 
by food, drinks and good company. Barry Goldwater surprised the crowd with an 
unannounced appearance, during which he serenaded the audience with his rendition of 
“Silent Night” played on the trombone. The dance raised another $300 that night for the 
campaign.
158
 
 Despite the best efforts of PCMF members, the media, high school students, and 
the generosity of 2,000 contributors, on December 25, the campaign fell short of their 
$300,000 goal. The foundation, however, did secure critical areas of the mountain. Only 
the Camel’s neck remained in private hands. In the end, contributions ranged from forty-
seven cents to the large donations from Goldwater and his mother, each of whom 
contributed $25,000 to the campaign. Other large contributions came from Henry Luce, 
who also donated $25,000 and from the Republic and Gazette, as well as John Pritzlaff, 
who each donated $10,000. Kober never wavered.  “The drive will continue,” she assured 
supporters; “we will not stop.”159 
 Negotiations between private landowners and the PCMF continued into 1966. By 
February, the foundation had received nearly 3,000 contributions. In March, Goldwater 
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announced that the group had completed the purchase of the south side of the mountain, 
but acknowledged that a long road lay ahead before it could secure the northern slope. To 
do so, the foundation required additional funds.  
 
Collaboration Leads to Preservation: Federal Funds for Camelback  
 Newly passed federal legislation came to Camelback’s rescue. In 1964, President 
Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, which 
became effective in January 1965. The law authorized federal grants to provide financial 
assistance to cities for a variety of activities, including up to fifty percent of the costs of 
buying and developing land for parks and conservation. Each state received an allocation 
of available funds for various conservation projects, subject to approval by the state’s 
Outdoor Recreation Coordinating Commission, which sent the application to the federal 
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) for final authorization. The act also established a 
contingency fund from which states could apply for grants. In September, Johnson signed 
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, which among other things provided 
funds for urban beautification under a Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Open 
Spaces Program. Both laws were among a slew of federal laws passed by Congress in the 
1960s to address environmental concerns. Between 1963 and 1968, Johnson signed into 
law almost 300 conservation and beautification measures, supported by more than $12 
90 
 
billion in authorized funds. The PCMF aggressively pursued funds from both these 
sources.
160
 
 Throughout the 1960s, Phoenix sought to expand its parks program, emphasizing 
the construction of parks for recreational purposes within the urban core. This initiative 
stemmed from a desire to provide children safe places for recreation. These parks 
contrasted with the more remote county mountain parks, as the city attempted to provide 
parks within walking distance of neighborhoods throughout the city. The shrinkage of 
available land, and its rising costs, however, precluded the development of large city 
parks, especially in older parts of the city. Instead, the Phoenix Parks Department 
promoted “miniparks” to serve the needs of inner-city residents. The city mostly relied on 
federal funds made available through the 1960’s legislation to erect playground 
equipment on a small piece of land, usually less than one acre. By the end of 1971, the 
city boasted fifty-seven developed parks on 1,650 acres and thirteen undeveloped parks 
on 660 acres. In addition, it had constructed thirty-nine miniparks, mostly located in the 
inner city.
161
  
 During March and April of 1966, the PCMF and VBCC looked into the 
possibility of obtaining funds from either the Land and Water Conservation Fund or the 
Open Spaces Program to purchase additional parcels on Camelback Mountain. To that 
end, members met and spoke with officials from the federal office of the Bureau of 
Outdoor Recreation, Housing and Urban Development, the Regional Bureau of Outdoor 
                                                          
160
 Martin Melosi, “Lyndon Johnson and Environmental Policy,” in ed. Robert Divine, The Johnson Years, 
Volume Two: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1987), 113 
and 130-140. 
161
 Collins, Emerging Metropolis, 146-150. For a broad depiction of the “minipark” movement throughout 
the nation, see Galen Crantz, The Politics of Park Design: A History of Urban Parks in America 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 138-147.  
91 
 
Recreation, Maricopa County Parks Department, and the Arizona Game and Fish 
Department. After these discussions, the City of Phoenix applied for a $200,000 grant 
from the Land and Water Conservation Fund to acquire the remaining land on top of 
Camelback. In April, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation informed the city it failed to meet 
two key requirements of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, and turned down the 
application. First, the BOR noted, the few primitive hiking trails on Camelback failed to 
satisfy the law’s requirement that the project promote active participant-type recreation. 
Secondly, both the city and county lacked a comprehensive recreation and open spaces 
plan, another prerequisite for federal funding. The agency recommended that Phoenix 
first develop a comprehensive plan, and then move forward with an application to the 
Open Spaces Program.
162
 
 The Phoenix city council took the BOR’s advice and utilized a metropolitan area 
transportation study for the Papago Freeway (see next chapter) to fulfill the 
comprehensive plan requirement, while also passing a resolution in August to develop an 
open spaces plan for the Phoenix Mountains. On December 13, 1966, the city council 
passed a resolution to submit an application to the Open Spaces Program for $250,000.
163
 
The PCMF and the city’s confident hopes for funding were quickly dashed. In January of 
1967, the assistant secretary of HUD’s San Francisco regional office issued a grim report 
on the possibility that Phoenix would receive any federal funds. The Open Spaces 
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Program “was extremely popular,” he explained. At the time of the city’s application, the 
demand for funds exceeded available appropriations by an almost six-to-one ratio, and 
that number would climb to twenty-to-one by the end of the year. Phoenix would not be 
receiving any HUD money.
164
 
 On June 2, 1967, the PCMF and the City of Phoenix once again applied for a 
grant from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. This time they asked for $269,625. 
The Camelback application competed with forty-three other applications within the state, 
including three others from the Phoenix alone. In total, the proposed projects asked for 
more than $2 million, at a time when the federal government had allocated only $800,000 
for distribution through the Arizona Outdoor Recreation Coordinating Commission 
(AORC). The AORC had decisions to make. To improve Camelback’s odds, the Phoenix 
city council voted unanimously to give its application priority status over the city’s three 
other proposals, which included a tennis court, new park sites, and a swimming pool. The 
council argued that those projects faced no imminent danger, while development on 
Camelback meant the loss of something unrecoverable. Vice-mayor Jarrett Jarvis touted 
the project’s value to Phoenix taxpayers because it required no expenditure of local 
public funds; only private donations collected by PCMF and federal funds. Once Phoenix 
had submitted its application, City Manager Ray Wilson wrote to AORCC chairman 
Dennis McCarthy asking that Camelback receive top priority.
165
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 The strategy paid off. McCarthy explained that Camelback warranted priority 
because of its status as a “nationally recognized landmark” and because there existed 
“widespread support in the community, as evidenced by the amount of money raised 
through public subscription.” On August 22, 1967, the AORCC voted unanimously to 
recommend a grant of $215,700 (80% of the city’s request), for the preservation of 
Camelback Mountain. Shortly thereafter, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation approved the 
grant for $211,250, to match funds collected by the PCMF. Stewart Udall officially 
bestowed the grant to the city on May 28, 1968. Lady Bird Johnson, a strong advocate for 
beautification projects and conservation, sat in attendance.
166
 On October 29, 1968, the 
Phoenix city council passed Resolution 13059, which authorized the acceptance of 
money and land donated by PCMF to secure Camelback “for all time in its natural 
beauty.” Land purchased by the city over the next few years added another seventy acres. 
By February 1971, the city owned all but one of the original parcels sought by PCMF. 
Charles Alberding never sold his property on Camelback Mountain, but Maggie Savoy 
did.
167
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Loose Ends: A Mountain to See, But Not Yet to Play
168
  
 By 1971, the City of Phoenix had saved the view of and from Camelback, but had 
failed to secure public access for recreation. While the city preserved the land above 
1,800-feet from development, the area below remained open to developers who sought to 
take advantage of the scenic views from the mountain’s ridges and construct luxury 
homes and resorts. In addition, property owners resisted efforts to create a public park 
and trails to the summit of the mountain that would cross their property or viewshed. To 
make Camelback a “meaningful area,” Arizona Republic columnist Ben Avery explained, 
the public must have access. “It is imperative,” he urged, that “Echo Canyon be 
added.”169 The bowl-shaped formation nestles under the Camel’s head, also known as 
Praying Monk, on the western side of the mountain, and straddles the border of Paradise 
Valley, Scottsdale, and Phoenix. In the 1920s and 1930s, the bowl served as a concert 
venue, hence the formation’s name. Little development occurred in this area and it 
remained one of the “pristine” examples of a Sonoran Desert ecosystem.  
 In December 1970, architect Joe Lort walked into Western Savings Bank. 
Western Resources had hired Lort to do something with the 129 acres they owned near 
Echo Canyon. He hoped Gary Driggs, President of Western Savings, would provide a 
loan for the development of a subdivision of single-family homes. Driggs, however, was 
not your average banker. He grew up in the shadow of the mountain. There, among the 
granite and cactus, Driggs had his self-proclaimed finest high school moments, spent with 
high school sweethearts. An avid climber, Driggs made one of the first ascents of the 
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mountain’s famous rock, Praying Monk, in 1951. And he never tired of explaining the 
natural history of the mountain to climbing or hiking companions. John Driggs, mayor of 
the city in 1970, also happened to be his brother. So, when Joe Lort walked into his 
office, Gary Driggs quickly rushed to defend his mountain.
170
  
 Meanwhile, on the northeastern side of Camelback, residents on Cholla Lane 
made life difficult for hikers. Residents complained of trespassers, who made parking 
difficult and threatened to turn the road into a “Lover’s Lane,” that invited litter and all 
sorts of “devious” activity, including vandalism and burglary. Cholla Lane residents 
posted “No Parking Signs” and verbally harassed those seeking access to the hiking trail. 
On one trip, they even harangued Barry Goldwater, who told them politely to go to hell. 
Editorials in the Arizona Republic expressed similar sentiments. The recalcitrant property 
owners made it “practically impossible for anyone to use the trail,” which ran 
northwesterly toward Echo Canyon.
171
 
 Gary Driggs called his brother and convinced the Phoenix Mayor that the 
preservation of Echo Canyon required immediate action. The brothers worked out a deal 
between Western Resources and the city. Under their plan, the city acquired ninety-one 
acres from Western Resources for the development of a park and recreation area, while 
the developer received forty acres of flat land near McDonald Drive to build a cluster 
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subdivision further down the mountain’s slope. The cluster-housing plan required a 
change of zoning laws to allow a higher residential density, but this allowed the city to 
acquire a larger chunk of land. The city approved the plan on December 15, 1970, and the 
following month sent an application for federal aid under the Land and Water 
Conservation Fund. Mayor Driggs paid a visit to present the city’s case for federal aid to 
the Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel.  
 In March 1972, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation approved Phoenix’s application 
and granted Phoenix $207,500, which it used to purchase 75.8 acres of land. The city 
failed, however, to resolve the dispute between several landowners in the path of the 
proposed hiking trail and other residents who saw the park as a hindrance to their land 
rights. Nonetheless, Mayor John Driggs dedicated the park on November 17, 1973, with 
Margaret Kober presenting the last of the PCMF funds to the city. Today, a ramada and 
parking area are the park’s only fabricated trimmings. A sign reminds visitors: 
“Let no one say 
And say it to your shame 
That all was beauty here 
Until you came.”172 
 
 Visitors to Echo Canyon, however, still encountered difficulties. Hikers following 
an undeveloped trail that had been in use for decades had to cross three parcels of 
privately held land, two vacant lots, and one residential property. The property owners, 
Paradise Valley residents, resented the proposed park. Feeling that it infringed on their 
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land rights and disrupted the solitude they sought when they initially acquired the 
property, they filed lawsuits to reduce the flow of hikers. The city first tried to create 
public access through condemnation of a portion of the properties, but a Maricopa 
County court ruled in favor of the property owners. Over the next three years, the city 
attempted to work out a deal to purchase the land, but struggled to find a price that the 
property owners would accept. In the meantime, one property holder attempted to charge 
hikers a five-dollar toll. Eventually they came to an agreement. In 1975, the city 
purchased the two vacant lots (2.4 acres) for a total of $68,900. Backed by a court ruling, 
the City of Phoenix condemned a twenty-foot wide easement in the back of the third 
residential property to provide open access to the hiking trail, which the city surrounded 
with a fence to prevent trespassing. At this time, the PCMF dissolved. Hikers continued 
to use an unofficial trail at Cholla Lane until the city reached an agreement in 1979 with 
the Phoenician resort, which bought the Jokake Inn, and allowed the construction of a 
public access trail in the mid-1980s. More than one-hundred volunteers helped build the 
trail. Finally, the city truly possessed its mountain, with a trail extending to the peak.
173
  
 
Coda: A Mountain’s Meaning  
 Phoenix’s first public preservation campaign did more than protect the summit of 
the city’s iconic mountain. Phoenicians demonstrated that they valued Camelback’s 
aesthetic and recreational values above economic development. Sixteen of the twenty-six 
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municipal governments operating across the Valley feature mountains on their logo, and 
hiking continues to be a popular activity. Every year, 300,000 people ascend 
Camelback.
174
 In 1992, the city designated Camelback Mountain one of twenty-five 
“points of pride,” and acknowledged it as the Valley’s most iconic landmark. It remains 
one of the most popular urban hikes in America. Moreover, the name “Camelback” 
appears more frequently than any other “signature name or icon” in the Valley, appearing 
on buildings, streets, neighborhoods, and schools.
175
 The Arizona Republic celebrated the 
thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of Echo Canyon Park with a weeklong series 
dedicated to the mountain. Most importantly, every time new developers have sought to 
build on the mountain, such as the proposed expansion of the Phoenician resort in 1995, 
the city has risen to the challenge of defending the mountain’s 1,800-foot mark. Based on 
aerial photographs, the city parks department determined no perceptible change in 
vegetation on the mountain occurred from 1971 to 1995.
176
  
 The campaign also provided useful lessons for future, larger preservation efforts. 
First, development of Camelback’s slopes demonstrated what could happen without 
preventative action, and the difficulty and expense of attempting to reclaim privately held 
land for public purposes. Efforts to establish the North Mountains Preserve in the 1970s, 
which at the time included time over 7,000 acres, modeled and expanded their public 
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campaign after the PCMF.
177
 The Phoenix Mountains Preservation Council (PMPC), a 
non-profit corporation similar to PCMF, relied on monthly newsletters, bumper stickers, 
special concerts, media support in the city papers, and a non-profit corporation, Save Our 
Mountains, to collect donations of land and money. Several bond approvals, including 
$23 million in 1973, demonstrate their success, as well as the resoluteness with which 
Phoenicians have embraced natural and publicly owned mountains as part of their quality 
of life. Like their predecessors, activists persistently attended city council meetings and 
zoning hearings to pressure city leaders to protect the mountains. The effort to save 
Camelback preserved over three hundred acres on the mountain’s summit, but this 
remained elusive until federal legislation opened up matching funds for the preservation 
in the mid-1960s. Recognizing that the effort to save 300 acres on Camelback’s summit 
required congressional legislation to open up federal funds, future campaigns relied 
heavily on federal coffers. Efforts to establish the North Mountains Preserve required 
several federal grants throughout the 1970s. Like the preservation of Camelback, the 
funds came from the Land and Water Conservation Fund.  
 The PMPC never disbanded, and continues to make open space preservation part 
of the growth dialogue in the city. The Phoenix Mountains Preserve, which now includes 
Camelback, South Mountain, North Mountain Park, and others, is the largest protected 
mountain area within any city’s limits in the country. In 1998, Arizona voters passed the 
Growing Smarter Act, which authorized the state to provide $20 million per year to assist 
cities to acquire and maintain open spaces. Phoenix has actively pursued these funds in 
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acquiring and maintaining open spaces. Finally, the preservation of Camelback Mountain 
demonstrates the power of community action and public-private partnerships in 
confronting urban challenges.  
 While local concern initiated the campaign to save Camelback, decisions by 
federal, state, and local government officials turned sentiment into action. Beginning with 
MCPZC chair Casey Abbot, a number of municipal, county, and state bureaucrats played 
an important role in the preservation efforts’ success. In particular, federal funds proved 
crucial to preserving Camelback. This is especially ironic as Barry Goldwater, a staunch 
libertarian and fiscal conservative, and PCMF had to ask the federal government for 
funds. Moreover, local and state government decisions to prioritize Camelback over other 
projects eligible for federal funds further demonstrate the necessity of government 
intervention to protect the environment as a public good. Without federal legislation in 
the 1960s, it is hard to imagine PCMF preserving the mountain as they struggled to raise 
sufficient funds to buyout private landowners.   Phoenix City Council Resolution 
ultimately protects the mountain in perpetuity, but civic watchdog groups remain crucial 
to raising the alarm when open spaces are threatened. 
 When open spaces emerged as an important factor in quality of life and urban 
growth debates in the 1950s, Phoenix government officials and private citizens lacked the 
know-how and the resources to protect and preserve mountain and desert landscape, 
especially when the land was privately held. For twenty-years, they stumbled and 
progressed in a haphazard fashion, but they learned--how to organize, how to foster 
private-public collaboration, how to appeal to the public and decision-makers, and where 
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to seek funds. By the 1970s, open spaces were a cornerstone of Phoenix’s urban 
planning. The city’s 1971 Open Space Plan makes that clear: “We must not continue to 
regard natural beauty, open space and recreation opportunity as luxuries to be bought 
only out of surplus funds.” Instead, the report recommended the city ensure “the kind of 
environment that satisfies a larger measure of the intangible qualities of our local 
lifestyle.” New problems plagued the Camel as the city continued to grow through the 
1970s when Phoenicians debated how to best solve the city’s transportation problems 
while also maintaining clean air. The debate centered on the West-Papago Inner Loop 
freeway. By the 1990s, the Camel was appearing in commercials, choking on the 
automobile exhaust and smog, in efforts to curb air pollution.
178
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CHAPTER 4: Phoenix and the Fight over West Papago-Inner Loop, 1969-1979   
 
 “What is the number one problem in Phoenix,” Mayor John Driggs asked in 1971. 
“Quite simply it is planning for orderly growth and one of the most vital elements in this 
whole planning process is a total transportation plan.” During the 1960s, Phoenix 
continued to be among the nation’s leaders in urban growth, but faced serious 
transportation problems. Like the issues of sanitation and open spaces, this problem 
largely stemmed from federally subsidized suburban development, in the form of 
favorable home loaning policies and funds for highway construction. Assistant City 
Manager Edward Hall explained, “large areas around the city of Phoenix developed 
without the streets constructed to proper standards,” often too narrow or unpaved, and the 
city needed to find a way to ameliorate this situation. Postwar transportation in Phoenix 
largely followed national trends towards automobile-centric living. Between 1947 and 
1957, the number of cars in the city tripled, which put Phoenix ahead of the national 
average in cars per person, but the development of the city’s freeways, often seen as the 
solution to postwar transportation issues, lagged considerably behind other cities of 
similar size.
179
 
 Nationwide, well-intentioned government officials sought to deal with 
transportation related urban growth problems by facilitating traffic through the city with 
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freeways, but faced backlash from citizens concerned with “freeway blight,” namely air 
pollution and the destruction of downtown residential neighborhoods. The lack of 
effective air pollution regulations, especially on automobiles led to clouds of eye-
stinging, lung hacking, pollution; an epic problem epitomized by smog clouds in Los 
Angeles and other large U.S. cities.
180
 By the late 1950s, cities across the nation---San 
Francisco, New Orleans, Boston, and Seattle---successfully revolted against urban 
freeway proposals.
181
 A study funded by the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act found 
Phoenix had the fourth worst air pollution in the nation. Robert Moses, architect of New 
York City’s freeway system and many others, noted that urban freeway segments of the 
interstate system were “the hardest to locate, the most difficult to clear, the most 
expensive to acquire and build, and the most controversial.”182 Phoenix’s West Papago-
Inner Loop underwent a similar struggle.  
 Like policies to protect public health through the creation of a centralized sewage 
treatment plant and efforts to preserve open spaces, federal policy and funds played a 
crucial role in directing local solutions to transportation problems. The federal 
government offered limited funds for mass transit until Congress established the Mass 
Transit Fund in 1982, but the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 provided a nine-to-one 
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federal-local ratio for freeway construction, which helped create 41,000 miles of 
interstate highway. Many cities, like Los Angeles, Denver, and Atlanta, developed 
networks of freeways that connected cities across the nation and linked cities with 
outlying suburbs.
183
 
 Part of these plans called for a southern transcontinental freeway (Interstate 10), 
linking Jacksonville, Florida to Santa Monica, California. One of the final segments of 
the original Interstate 10 went through more than two decades of controversy and was not 
completed until 1990. This section, the West Papago-Inner Loop, went through the heart 
of Phoenix. By 1969, when the city commissioned engineering firm formally proposed 
the urban freeway, significant portions of Intestate 10 had already been completed in 
Arizona and around metropolitan Phoenix. In the east, the interstate ran nearly linear 
from Tucson until stopping abruptly at 19
th
 Avenue and Durango. From there, drivers’ 
had to take a circuitous route on city streets to head west, where they could pick up the 
interstate again near Buckeye, before heading toward Los Angeles. As downtown traffic 
congestion worsened, finding a solution became a top priority for policymakers and the 
public. As the city debated the Inner Loop, State Highway engineers continued to expand 
and develop the east and west ends of the interstate, making the absence of the middle 
portion all the more salient.
184
  
 While federal transportation policy aided the creation of freeways and in turn, 
complemented federal subsidies for housing that incentivized suburban development, 
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federal environmental policy provided legal precedent for opposing freeways. The U.S. 
Congress passed the first federal legislation concerning air pollution in 1955, although 
the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act only provided funds for research. Over the next two 
decades, Congress expanded the law by prescribing specific pollution controls for both 
stationary and mobile sources to regulate an increasing number of contaminants, and 
required states’ to establish and enforce ambient air quality standards. The 1970 National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compounded freeway planners’ frustrations. It 
required Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) from major federal projects, such as 
those utilizing federal money to construct freeways, which assessed the project’s 
environmental consequences. Often, EISs slowed freeway construction and opened them 
to public debate.
185
  
 The city had already grappled with some of the unintended environmental 
consequences of rapid growth, like the loss of open space, and the rhetoric of 
environmentalism had become part of debates about urban growth. People and the 
institutions they serve, however, interpreted and incorporated environmental values into 
their pre-existing values differently in attempts to balance individual freedom and 
mobility, single-family homes, natural aesthetics, outdoor recreation, and clean air and 
water. Yet, neither the extension of municipal sewers nor the preservation of Camelback 
infringed on the “Southwestern” suburban lifestyle like the West Papago-Inner Loop did. 
Freeways and urban sprawl tended to support one another in low-density, decentralized 
development because public transit often could not efficiently serve outlying areas. 
Moreover, highways allowed subdivisions to stretch further from central cities. The 
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debate over the West Papago-Inner Loop highlighted a growing concern about the 
consequences of urban sprawl. The Inner Loop underwent three public votes in Phoenix. 
Initially, the public opposed the freeway, but in less than a decade overwhelmingly 
supported it, and so each vote acts as a window through which to examine the extent to 
which environmentalism influenced urban growth policy. 
 Ultimately, decisions about the West Papago-Inner Loop had roots in policy and 
urban planning dating back to the 1940s, but also reflected growing postwar concern for 
the environment. City and state transportation plans always assumed the construction of a 
cross-town freeway and subsequent network of outer-loop freeways to meet the city and 
its outlying areas’ transportation needs. The policy decisions based on these assumptions 
ultimately limited the success of those who opposed to the West Papago-Inner Loop. 
While the basic location of the freeway proved immovable, the opposition did have 
success altering the design of the mid-town segment. Unlike other successful grassroots 
campaigns in Phoenix, like the preservation of Camelback, the anti-freeway movement 
did not receive sustained support in the newspapers nor did it sustain widespread public 
activism. Moreover, the anti-freeway campaign offered few visible and viable 
alternatives to the freeway, which limited their ability to persuade voters to oppose the 
freeway. For many, a vote for the freeway became a vote about maintaining a low-density 
lifestyle, while many viewed a vote against the freeway as a decision to change that 
lifestyle. Postwar decisions have carried enormous weight in shaping contemporary 
Phoenix’s transportation system, as a ring of freeways surrounds the city, and only within 
the past decade has public opinion and policy begun to change.  
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Birth of the Inner Loop, 1944-1969  
 Explosive suburban growth at the end of World War II and planning reports and 
policy decisions to promote that growth ultimately resulted in the West Papago-Inner 
Loop proposal in 1969. In 1944, the Phoenix Metropolitan Survey became the first report 
to advocate for a cross-town freeway, explaining that, “if the city is to continue to grow 
and expand…other traffic arteries must be provided.”186 In 1948, the city shut down its 
streetcar system and shifted to a public bus system because its flexibility more readily 
serviced suburban areas. At the same time though, the State Legislature placed a 
“conditional ban on municipalities competing with private business in the utility or 
transportation field.” This ban included any municipal competition with private bus lines, 
and along with rising operating costs to service outlying areas, limited the city’s ability to 
extend transportation services to suburban areas. Between 1947 and 1954, the number of 
miles operated by the city bus system declined by 891,981 miles. In 1959, the city 
divested from its public bus system, and over the next decade, average daily ridership 
plummeted from 58,000 to 14,000 by 1970.  Meanwhile, the city expanded and improved 
it streets.
187
 
 The expansion and improvement of city streets became an endless cycle of need 
and fulfillment to meet the requirements of growth. City streets increased from 346 miles 
in 1950 to 1,630 miles in 1960. Despite the expansion of paved city streets, the number of 
unpaved County roads also increased, largely because the County did not require 
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subdivision contractors to pave streets. This mirrored city officials’ attempts to extend 
municipal sewers to meet the requirements of growth in outlying areas. Developers also 
neglected to pave roads in order to minimize costs. As a result, traffic in and out of the 
city increasingly slowed and city officials began to look for a way to reduce 
congestion.
188
  
 Following the passage of the Federal Highway Aid Act of 1956 and the 
availability of funds for transportation planning, the city commissioned a traffic study in 
1957, Better Roads for Tomorrow, to help create a highway plan. In 1960, the city 
commissioned the engineering firm Wilbur & Associates, who used data from the Better 
Roads study, to conduct a major street study assessing long-range traffic needs, which 
laid the groundwork for the Papago Freeway. The report found that the number of 
travelers from the outlying suburbs and nearby cities going east and west through 
downtown Phoenix already met or exceeded the desirable limits of existing roads. To 
meet the city’s current and future needs, the study advocated for a 200-mile network of 
freeways, with a downtown freeway that ran between Roosevelt Street and McDowell 
Road as the centerpiece. The downtown freeway would run from Black Canyon Freeway 
(I-17) in the west to the Maricopa Freeway in the east (I-10). While advocating for an 
attractive public transit system, the study demurred on recommendations for its 
expansion, claiming they were “not within the scope” of the study. These transportation 
planners believed as did many others that low-density development made public transit 
infeasible, and few envisioned any growth scenario that strayed from this vision of the 
Southwestern lifestyle. This refrain would often be repeated in favor of the freeway 
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construction over the next two decades. The Arizona Highway Commission, Maricopa 
County Board of Supervisors, and the City Council of Phoenix, Glendale, Avondale, 
Mesa, Buckeye, and Tempe adopted the Wilbur plan. Other western cities like Denver 
underwent similar car-centric planning.
189
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Figure 8. Map Showing the Location of the West Papago-Inner Loop. The map shows the 
location of the Papago through the city in red.
190
 
 
 
 As the Denver urban area’s population doubled between 1940 and 1960, the city 
stretched out in all directions across the South Platte River Valley; city officials found 
their streets inadequate to meet the growing number of people in an increasingly 
decentralized urban area. City planners focused exclusively on automobile-related 
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solutions, such as street expansions and highway construction. Like Phoenix, they 
accepted auto-dependency as an unalterable fact. Urban planning reports excluded or 
disparaged public transit options, and sought to allow “maximum freedom in direction 
and speed” to the automobile to liberate urban growth from traffic congestion. Through 
the 1960s, government officials in cities like Denver and Phoenix sought federal highway 
funds to implement their transportation plans.
191
 
 Over the next nine years, Phoenix sought to implement the Wilbur plan, but the 
city and state had to grapple with air pollution problems too. Phoenix requested the 
McDowell alignment (also referred to as Moreland Corridor) for the mid-town segment 
of the freeway to the Arizona Highway Department (AHD) in November 1962.
192
 On 
January 7, 1964, the Arizona Highway Commission and the Phoenix City Council, with 
support from groups like the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, and the Downtown 
Development Corporation of Phoenix, approved the McDowell alignment as the official 
location of the Papago Freeway through the city. Five months later, the Highway 
Commission authorized the first of 20 miles of right of way purchases. Eventually, 1,700 
homes and 60 businesses were demolished or relocated to make room for the freeway. 
That same month, the U.S. Bureau of Roads approved the Papago as part of the Interstate 
Highway System, making it eligible for federal financing.
193
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 In December 1966, with the freeway alignment now in place, the Arizona 
Highway Department contracted Johannessen and Girand Engineers to design the 
freeway and “investigate the total impact on the Metropolitan Phoenix area of the 
construction of a freeway across mid-town Phoenix.” This included a section dedicated to 
the freeway’s potential effects on the environment. The report, commissioned and funded 
by the Highway Department, however, limited its investigation only to freeway designs, 
lacking a discussion of freeway alternatives. It defended this limitation by stating, “we 
need freeways, and we will need more” because the automobile was a “hard reality of 
American life.”194  
 While the engineering team designed the freeway, national concern over air 
pollution and public health led to federal legislation that affected states’ policies. By the 
1960s, the medical community had identified smog as a contributor to respiratory 
illnesses and concluded that the young and elderly were particularly vulnerable.
195
 The 
1963 Clean Air Act established a program within the U.S. Public Health Service to 
research techniques to monitor air pollution, and in 1967, the Air Quality Act expanded 
these efforts and funded ambient air quality studies as well as stationary pollution source 
inspections.
196
 During the 1960s, Phoenix consistently ranked in the top ten of worst air  
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pollution cities in the nation. The Governor’s Commission on Arizona Beauty concerned 
itself with not only preserving open space, but also the declining quality of the city’s air. 
In 1966, the Commission’s Interim Report found air pollution a “detriment to the natural 
beauty and attractiveness of Arizona” and recommended the state do more to curb 
pollution. Feeling the pressure, Mayor Milton Graham formed a commission to study and 
provide recommendations to deal with the city’s air pollution problem. From atop South 
Mountain, the commission noted, they could not see downtown Phoenix. Despite 
acknowledging the automobile’s role in the problem, the committee merely 
recommended more studies after fierce lobbying from automotive interests in the Valley. 
The state legislature finally passed its first air pollution control act in 1967, requiring 
counties to form air pollution control districts, and authorizing the state to step in if 
counties’ failed to curb air pollution satisfactorily. The legislation, though, lacked the 
regulatory teeth to penalize violators and the state seldom intervened.
197
 
 In December 1968, Johannessen-Girand firm provided their freeway design 
recommendation to government officials. The Papago Freeway report advocated an 
elevated concept design, with the Papago running from 91
st
 Avenue to 22
nd
 Street. First, 
the design cost the least of three options under review, the other two being depressed and 
variable-grade designs. Second, the team believed the elevated concept had superior 
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aesthetic and recreational potential. The design attempted to incorporate environmental 
values, noting Secretary of the Department of Transportation Alan Boyd’s call on 
freeway builders to take more care to protect cities’ air, water, parks, and neighborhoods. 
They undertook a survey, which found that Phoenicians most commonly cited the 
suburban and rural atmosphere as the factors they liked best about the city. The team 
highlighted these values in a promotional pamphlet that emphasized opportunities for 
many recreational activities underneath the freeway.
198
 
 The freeway would average 25-feet above ground through the city; two “helicoil” 
interchanges spiraled 280 degrees and lifted automobiles100-feet onto the elevated 
portion of the freeway between 7
th
 Street and 7
th
 Avenue. The design included a 43-acre 
park with walking and cycling paths, fountains, and an outpost of the Phoenix Art 
Museum underneath the freeway. This was a major section the West Papago-Inner Loop, 
the 5.5-mile stretch through downtown along Moreland and Culver Streets. The elevated 
freeway concept was not a novel design though. Futuristic urban planners made similar 
proposals for New York, New Orleans, Seattle, and San Francisco around the same time; 
all met significant public resistance. None called for a freeway to soar 100-feet in the 
air.
199
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 Still, VBCC President Sam Mardian endorsed the design explaining “the essential 
importance of the park-like atmosphere associated with the Freeway.” The city created a 
concurrent report that argued for “an adequate freeway” to solve transportation problems 
in Phoenix “now and in the future” because Phoenicians desire for low-density living 
made public transit difficult. In 1969, the city had only 26 miles of freeway, while 
freeway experts claimed there should be one mile for every 10,000 people, which meant 
Phoenix “needed” 80 miles. The Phoenix City Council and Arizona Highway 
Commission both endorsed the plan within a month of the report’s completion and prior 
to a public hearing. At the public hearing, city residents expressed serious misgivings 
about the prospect of a 100-foot tall freeway “soaring” over downtown.200 
 
Figure 9. The Papago Free Elevated Concept Design. The image shows the elevated 
concept design of the Inner Loop with the helicoils.
201
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Freeway Fracas: Public Resistance to the Papago, 1969-1973  
 
 By the late 1960s, freeway revolts were underway in cities across the nation in 
response to the unanticipated consequences of complete reliance on the automobile and 
the construction of urban freeways. While Phoenicians considered the West Papago-Inner 
Loop, for example, opposition to the Riverfront Freeway in New Orleans gained national 
attention. In 1965, the Riverfront Freeway, which would cut through New Orleans’ 
historic French Quarter as it ran along the Mississippi River 40-feet in the air, first 
sparked resistance from residents of the district. Many felt the freeway would cut off 
those residents from the rest of the city and the river, as well as create noise and air 
pollution in the historic neighborhood. The opposition frequently pointed to the harm 
caused by the section of Interstate 10 that ran along Claiborne Avenue as an example of 
the unintended consequences of freeways. That segment of freeway resulted in noise and 
air pollution, and effectively divided neighborhoods. Despite support for the freeway 
from the Central Business District of New Orleans, the opposition waged a successful 
public campaign that garnered not only citywide support, but support from around the 
nation, as the New York Times and San Francisco Chronicle followed the events. In the 
end, the opponents defeated the Riverfront Freeway.
202
 
 Phoenicians’ too, began to reconsider urban freeways. These concerns primarily 
focused on the freeways location and design, as well as air pollution from a greater 
concentration of cars downtown. While Arizona State University School of Architecture 
                                                          
202
 For a discussion of the Riverfront Freeway in New Orleans, see Lewis, Divided Highways, 181-210. For 
more information of freeway revolts in the late 1960s, see Gutfreund, Twentieth Century Sprawl, 102-105. 
Also see sources listed in footnote 4. [I marked this in your previous draft, too. You say “see sources in 
footnote 4,” but there is only one source cited in footnote 4: Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier.]  
116 
 
Dean, James Elmore, gave the elevated concept the highest aesthetic grades, noting that 
piers lifting the freeway made it appear to “float” along the horizon, much of the public 
saw it as an eyesore; a “Berlin Wall” dividing the city that would produce noise and air 
pollution. Despite support from the VBCC, the group remained cautionary over the 
effects of air pollution: “Phoenix averages more hours of sunlight than any city in the 
Western Hemisphere, but this God-given treasure will be rendered useless if a smog 
cover precludes residents from enjoying it.” However, freeways and individual mobility 
remained the primary focus of city planners, not public transit, with no official more 
supportive than Assistant City Manager Ed Hall. By 1971, the private bus company 
serving the city was in dire financial straits and required a bailout by the city. While the 
city resumed ownership over the system, the private company remained in control of 
operations. The bus system did not receive the same attention as freeways, barely 
mentioned, if at all, in the city’s transportation plans. Moreover, the deteriorated state of 
the bus system meant public transit advocates lacked a visible, successful policy 
alternative to freeways. This left Phoenix mayors reluctant to support public transit 
initiatives, especially with little federal funding for such projects. For instance, Mayor 
Milton Graham readily accepted federal funds for highways, but turned down federal 
money for the city’s bus system.203  
 Until 1969, the Papago Freeway remained largely a matter planned and promoted 
by government officials. Though the city held prior public hearings about an east-west 
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downtown freeway, in 1957, 1960 and 1965, they were poorly advertised and failed to 
garner the widespread public response the 1969 hearing did. Many homeowners in the 
downtown route of the freeway became aware of the freeway only when the highway 
department began making right-of-way purchases in 1965. Johannessen’s proposal for the 
elevated freeway design through central Phoenix prompted a hotly contested debate. It 
centered on whether the city needed a freeway at all and what potential alternatives 
existed; if a freeway was necessary, what should it look like. The latter gained the most 
widespread traction, as the public and press harangued the elevated design, despite efforts 
by the designers to assert its social and environmental benefits.
204
 
 The public hearing held on January 23, 1969 gave citizens the chance to voice 
their concerns, but since right of way purchases had already begun and the freeway plan 
had already been underway since 1960, it carried significant institutional momentum that 
limited possible changes. At the hearing, the freeway design team and government 
officials from Phoenix and the State Highway Department presented the benefits of the 
freeway, emphasizing the elevated design’s lower costs, as well as its aesthetic and 
recreational value. A large portion of public comments regarded right of way purchases 
from those living in the freeway corridor. Mrs. E.P. O’Rourke, a homeowner on West 
Latham Street, worried the city would construct the freeway right in front of her home 
and create an eyesore. She lived in Greater Encanto-Palmcroft neighborhood, one of the 
oldest in Phoenix and home to the strongest and most persistent resistance to the freeway. 
Mrs. Derek Van Dyke, who also lived in the Encanto area, expressed similar concerns. 
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By 1972, nearly 2,000 homeowners in the area banded together to form the Encanto 
Citizens Association to oppose both the location and design of the freeway.
205
  
 While many felt the city should give more attention to public transit, only a vocal 
minority actively pursued these ends. Renz Jennings, a former State Supreme Court 
Justice, expressed misgivings about the freeway and the lack of dialogue about mass 
transit, especially when cities like Montreal, San Francisco, and Tokyo were in the midst 
of building new rapid rail transit systems. Public transit activists continually asked why 
the city refused to consider a rail system. Jennings feared the freeway would put Phoenix 
on the path of becoming a mini Los Angeles, with its well-publicized traffic congestion 
and smog, and he helped form one of the primary opposition groups to the downtown 
freeway in December 1969, Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways (CMTAF).
206
 
 As the public debated the freeway, municipal planning groups had their own 
discussions. The Land Transportation Committee of Phoenix Forward, an urban planning 
committee consisting of prominent business and civic leaders largely in favor of 
freeways, reviewed a number of transportation reports and studies before making their 
recommendation. The Committee ranked flexibility and personal choice as top priorities 
for a transportation system and produced a report that favored automobiles and freeways. 
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They noted that “Phoenicians want to live with a lot of open space; they want to travel 
about our valley in their own cars, free to come and go when they want.” Motel and hotel 
owners opposed the freeway route because as planned it lacked interchanges on Van 
Buren Street where a large concentration of lodging was located. Largely though, they 
proved to be the exception and not the rule. Most business interests, increasingly located 
in the outlying areas of the city near suburban subdivisions, and municipal planners 
concerned with promoting economic and urban growth, supported the freeway.
207
  
 Business interests worried that traffic problems would hurt tourism and make it 
difficult to recruit corporations to Phoenix. Nationwide, states offered hundreds of 
millions of dollars in freeway related contracts, and the auto industry accounted for 
millions of jobs. In Phoenix, cross-town streets carried 30% more traffic than they were 
designed to: in 1968, 93% of the households in the city owned private transportation 
while almost 40% owned two or more cars. This statistic, however, excludes multi-family 
housing, which put car ownership closer to 50%. Phoenix banker Gary Driggs explained 
the situation, “If we don’t do something about it, Phoenix will become famous for its 
traffic snarls the same way Los Angeles is. Growth will slow.” A report by Valley Area 
Traffic and Transportation Study (VATTS), formed by Maricopa Association of 
Governments (MAG) in 1966, provided nearly identical conclusions.
208
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 There lacked consensus though. One-third of the Transportation Committee 
opposed the recommendation given to the city council and created a Minority Report. 
They argued that the city needed to further consider public transit alternatives, and that 
the Papago report failed to consider the total impact of pollutants from car exhaust like 
sulfur dioxide. Furthermore, they claimed the Committee’s recommendation reflected the 
bias of members who represented local contracting firms, engineering firms, builder 
suppliers, and others who would profit from freeway construction while dividing 
downtown neighborhoods and weakening communal identity.  Still, others noted that 
reliance on private automobiles disadvantaged non-drivers: the disabled, poor, and 
elderly.
209
  
 By the late 1960s, the downtown character of Phoenix, like many American cities, 
but especially automobile- centric western cities, had changed considerably, as office-
buildings replaced retail stores and residential buildings. Shopping centers anchored by 
box stores and supermarkets shifted to outlying areas. Downtown became a commuter 
center, where those living the suburban dream worked to ensure payments on their FHA 
mortgage. In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, 
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which required an environmental impact statement for the Papago Freeway and provided 
more time for public discussion as resistance to the freeway grew.
210
 
 While the ADOT created an EIS, Phoenix commissioned a survey to gauge public 
opinion over the freeway. Residents living in central Phoenix least desired an east-west 
freeway, but as one moved further east or west to suburban areas, more residents 
expressed a desire for a freeway. The survey also found that the public favored the 
depressed design over the elevated one, but regardless of which concept they preferred, 
respondents cited aesthetic and recreational factors, such as the elimination of noise and 
pollution, the preservation of natural scenery and views, and the opportunity for parks, as 
important factors in their decision. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress passed the 1970 Clean 
Air Act (CAA), which established National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to 
control stationary and mobile sources of air pollution. One of the goals of the law was to 
achieve NAAQS in every state by 1975, something Arizona struggled to accomplish, in 
part because of reliance on automobiles, but also due to a large number of dirt roads in 
the county and emissions from mining operations along with natural sources like dust. 
The 1977 Amendments expanded the law by providing a detailed timetable for the 
reduction of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons from automobiles. Nevertheless, the 
1970 CAA provided ammunition from which freeway opponents assailed the Papago 
proposal.
211
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 Public concern over the quality of the environment provided the impetus behind 
the 1970 CAA and subsequent environmental legislation in the 1970s. The first Earth 
Day was the culmination of this sentiment, with teach-ins and demonstrations held in 
cities, at college campuses, high schools, and places of worship around the nation. In 
New York, activists convinced Mayor John Lindsay to shut down Fifth Avenue from 
Fourteenth Street to Fifty-Ninth—all automobiles were banned from noon until midnight. 
Fifth Avenue became a carnival and educational experience with over two hundred 
booths and exhibits. Demonstrators put cars on trial for damage to the environment, while 
others delivered capital punishment, tearing them apart as crowds cheered. Nearly 
250,000 people attended the day’s festivities in New York, with millions participating 
around the country. In Phoenix, Earth Day activists also focused on the automobile, but 
demonstrations were on a smaller scale. For instance, Arizona State University held a full 
day of activities, including workshops, lectures, and forums, that averaged 200 or more 
people in attendance. Renz Jennings led a discussion on air pollution and the lack of 
emissions controls for automobiles. Many high schools held bike or walk to school days, 
and Washington High School students even “skinned” an automobile, pulling it apart bit 
by bit. Furthermore, the 1970 Arizona Town Hall, an annual report on the city’s progress, 
problems, and outlook by government officials, civic and business leaders, academics, 
and the public, focused on “The Total Environment.” Participants expressed particular 
concern for air pollution problems. The group went so far as to recommend, “mass 
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transportation be recognized as a social and economic end, both for individuals and for 
the preservation of our environment.” Phoenicians had begun to pay more attention to the 
air quality problem in the city at the same time the Highway Department was assessing 
the environmental impacts of the West Papago-Inner Loop. Increased public awareness 
and interest of air quality issues in the city promised a careful evaluation of the EIS.
212
 
 In 1972, the AHD completed the draft EIS for comment by federal and state 
agencies, interested organizations, and the public. The report attempted to assuage 
concern over the environmental impact of the freeway, claiming it would have “no 
serious or prolonged effect on land use,” it would reduce air pollution by mitigating stop-
and-go traffic, and provide recreational opportunities. While it included lots of technical 
data, EPA Regional Director Paul De Falco called the EIS myopic because it failed to 
consider the full range of transportation alternatives available to the city. The report 
contained a literature review that merely displayed alternatives created by others, but 
showed no evidence that it seriously evaluated them or undertook its own studies. Lastly, 
the draft provided no comparison between the impacts of the freeway and mass transit 
options on air pollution, which was especially notable since freeways would increase 
long-term dependence on the car, widely acknowledged as the source of Phoenix’s severe 
air quality problem. The Department of Interior found similar weaknesses in the EIS.
213
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 Public response echoed these critiques, with groups like Saguaro Cactus Club and 
Arizona Women’s Political Caucus, expressing concern over the lack of public transit 
alternatives and the omission of nitrous oxides (NOx) and its role in smog creation. 
Moreover, they argued that the 100-foot helicoils promised to strain car engines, and 
increase emissions. Already, in 1969, 79% of NOx pollution in Maricopa County came 
from cars. No group though, excoriated the report more severely than CMTAF. The 
organization comprised of many members from the Land Transportation Committee 
minority, and Phoenix College chemistry professor Gerald Judd spearheaded their 
critique of the freeway plan. Judd attacked their conclusions about the total pollutant load 
contributed by the 100,000 to 150,000 additional cars the downtown freeway would 
carry. In particular, Judd lambasted the complete lack of discussion of sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), a notable absence considering 62.5% of SO2 emissions in Phoenix came from 
automobiles. Moreover, Judd criticized the lack of discussion of the medical effects of 
pollutants created by cars, already acknowledged by the medical community in places 
like Los Angeles. The AHD brushed off these complaints claiming, “the primary purpose 
of this freeway is to move people and goods.”214 
 During the first half of 1972, Phoenix and the AHD held six community forums 
on the future of transportation, inviting numerous transportation experts from the Valley 
and around the country to speak. Walter Scheiber, Executive Director of the Metropolitan 
Washington Council of Governments, gave the keynote address and explained, “the 
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important question should be not how fast does your community grow, but how well does 
your community grow.” Despite this exhortation, discussions largely centered on 
freeways, more specifically their necessity, because most of the experts invited were 
involved in freeway planning. The forum planners grouped all the public transit 
advocates in the third forum, with citizen proposals, including a broad outline for a light 
rail plan by CMTAF, in the fourth.
215
 
  Most freeway advocates argued that cars and freeways afforded people flexibility 
and freedom, while reducing traffic congestion and the associated environmental effects. 
Moreover, many presented themselves as mediators of an environmental agenda gone too 
far. J.W. McDonald, representing the Phoenix Automobile Club, agreed, “the increased 
sensitivity which we all have developed with regard to negative environmental side-
effects is good,” but he explained “that we are in some cases over-reacting.” Others 
argued that the city grew up with the automobile and low density living, even though the 
city’s density was about average when excluding preserved areas like Camelback. 
Further, they argued that while certain types of mass transit worked for denser cities like 
New York or Philadelphia, they were incompatible with Phoenix’s low-density layout. 
Freeway advocates believed freeways would allow the city to continue growing without 
damaging the environment. Phoenix Planning Director John Beatty explained “highways 
are needed essentially to open new lands and new opportunities in the areas adjoining 
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Phoenix,” but “the future growth of Phoenix is highly dependent on both the quantity and 
quality of the whole living environment.”216  
 Conversely, Thomas Deen, Vice President of a Washington, D.C. urban planning 
firm, noted that while cars provided freedom, they created a host of other problems for 
urban planners like air pollution and traffic congestion. Moreover, public transit like 
rapid rail uses less land and allows room for more open spaces. While public transit 
advocates could muster strong and pointed criticism of freeways, they seldom produced 
attractive, visible, and viable alternatives for a sprawling city like Phoenix. If they did 
attempt to point to the success of the subway system in New York City, freeway 
advocates argued Phoenix was different and therefore the solution did not apply. The 
deteriorated public bus system in the city certainly did not help mass transit arguments. 
This led many, including Phoenix Mayor John Driggs, to view the freeway as essential to 
an effective and efficient transportation system for Phoenix.
217
  
 In March 1972, Mayor Driggs organized a freeway support group that sought to 
expedite the construction of Inner Loop by shifting public opinion in favor of the 
freeway. They gave public presentations in favor of the freeway and received support 
from business groups. For example, the Civic Plaza Business Association created a 
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pamphlet that sought to provide “The Truth About Freeways,” linking cars to freedom 
and opined that “within the next ten years emissions from motor vehicles will be virtually 
pollution-free” due to emission standards set in the 1970 CAA. Still, the city’s two major 
newspapers, which played an important role in building support for the preservation of 
Camelback, actively opposed the freeway, bashing and belittling the Inner Loop, 
especially the helicoil section, on a daily basis. This worried the pro-freeway lobby.
218
 
 Mayor Driggs met with Eugene Pulliam, publisher of both the Arizona Republic 
and Phoenix Gazette, whose personal opposition to the freeway colored his papers’ 
coverage, and tried to persuade him to see the situation differently. He failed. Pulliam 
argued the West Papago-Inner Loop would destroy the low-density lifestyle he loved and 
further congest downtown with tailpipe exhaust. “I don’t care if we grow in our density 
pattern all the way to Wickenburg,” Pulliam exclaimed, “that would be better than the 
environmental change to our lifestyle that would occur from a major urban freeway 
plan.” With Pulliam’s assistance, the tide was indeed turning. Architect Jerome Diethelm, 
who helped design the freeway, stated that constructing the freeway would be “socially 
destructive and environmentally undesirable on many counts,” noting air and noise 
pollution as two. In April 1973, the mayor wanted the issue settled, and announced a 
citizens’ advisory election in May rather than the general election in November, to 
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prevent other issues from submerging it and to potentially reduce voter turnout in an off 
season election.
219
  
 The next month both sides campaigned vigorously, with the Central Business 
District spending over $15,000 on the pro-freeway campaign. Support also came from 
homebuilders, and others involved in housing and road construction, including the 
Central Arizona Labor Council, mostly because they believed it would aid future 
growth.
220
 Meanwhile, CMTAF, Encanto Citizens Association, and the “Pulliam Press” 
continued to attack the environmental impacts of the freeway. CMTAF produced a 
counter-EIS, which outlined the “disastrous process of building urban freeways” to all 
school and public libraries in Maricopa County. The counter-EIS included a plan for a 
light rail system, but the city and state never seriously considered the proposal. 
Promotional materials asked citizens “Who Loved Mountains?” and noted that more cars 
meant more smog, and less visible mountains. CMTAF conducted a survey, printed in 
both the Republic and Gazette, which found half of respondents supported public transit 
alternatives and were willing to pay, so long as they moved people as or more efficiently 
than cars and costs did not climb above four dollars daily to ride. Pulliam’s newspaper 
coordinated with the Encanto Citizens’ Association for reporting and editorial pieces, as 
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well as to publicize anti-freeway events. One editorial in the Phoenix Gazette exclaimed, 
“Wherever the freeway might go, it threatens to wreck the way of life here for enormous 
segments of the population.”221  
 The Phoenix Planning Commission split over the issue. Dwight Busby, a member 
of the Commission since 1964, accused the city, namely Ed Hall, of being “inflexible” 
and claimed “the only comprehensive (transportation) planning the city has done is on a 
freeway system.” Commissioner Sid McClee expressed the feelings of many city 
officials. “The whole problem is not answered by freeways,” he said, “but we don’t yet 
have the answer to the transportation problem.” William Bell, another commissioner, 
took this sentiment one-step further. Bell explained, “nothing else has been proposed” 
and “until we have something else I suppose we have the freeway.” Over time, this 
sentiment exerted strong influence on the debate over the downtown freeway, as the 
public and government officials increasingly felt pressure to take action to solve the 
city’s transportation issues.222  
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 As the city considered the West Papago-Inner Loop, state officials attempted to 
develop an air quality plan, as mandated by the 1970 CAA. The EPA disapproved 
Arizona’s plan in 1972 because it lacked effective controls for sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides, which led to unacceptable air quality levels in urban areas. Governor 
Jack Williams, among other government officials, explained the difficulty in attempting 
to curb air pollution from automobiles. Reducing the number of vehicle miles driven in 
the city meant subjecting “the people of Arizona to vast and permanent alterations in their 
lifestyle” that placed “a high value on low density living.” The state passed a law later in 
1972 that funded the construction of a vehicle emissions testing lab. Two years later the 
legislature passed a law that required mandatory emissions inspections for vehicles, 
which in addition to new federal emissions requirements, was commonly cited by pro-
freeway advocates as the technological solution to air pollution.
223
  
 On May 8, 1973, voters spoke: 58% rejected the Inner Loop as proposed in the 
Papago report and the city council passed Resolution 14111, which called for 
abandoning the proposed Inner Loop. While the elevated design was the primary reason 
for opposition, Phoenicians also voted against the freeway due to design factors, its 
location and the division of neighborhoods, concern over air pollution, and to a lesser 
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extent a desire for mass transit alternatives. Moreover, a study found Pulliam’s 
newspapers played an important role in influencing their vote against the freeway. The 
city council resolution to abandon the Inner Loop required the Arizona Highway 
Commission to “once again examine all feasible alternatives for connecting Interstate 10 
in Phoenix and to choose the most feasible plan.”224 
 
Papa-go-go: Finally a Freeway, 1974-1979  
 In January 1974, the AHD hired the Gruen engineering firm to design alternatives 
for the Papago. While Gruen carried out the study and engaged in an extensive program 
of citizen involvement from January to March 1974, MAG, the Central Arizona Chapter 
of American Institute of Architects (AIA), and Valley Forward sponsored a team from 
the AIA to visit Phoenix to provide recommendations for urban growth. The AIA team 
characterized Phoenix’s way of life as a “Western suburban ethic:” a fondness for open 
spaces where land, resources, or the potential for growth seemed unlimited. AIA 
recommended limited, depressed freeways carefully placed to ensure neighborhood and 
communities retain character, but also felt mass transit should be a key element in the 
proposal. This report helped shape the Gruen study.
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 In February 1975, Gruen produced its alternatives study and concluded that the 
extension of I-10 through the heart of Phoenix would be the “costliest, most destructive 
and most polluting” of the five alternative routes studied. Instead, Gruen advocated for a 
depressed freeway south of the city, the Durango Alignment. MAG and the Phoenix City 
Council endorsed this option for the I-10 in March. Meanwhile, Phoenix Mayor Timothy 
Barrow established the Moreland Corridor Ad Hoc Advisory Committee, which 
recommended a multi-use parkway in the downtown freeway corridor. The Phoenix City 
Council and Mayor Barrow endorsed the recommendation. However, the downtown 
freeway option had momentum on its side: the Highway Department already had cleared 
85% of that route and the report also showed it would accommodate the largest volume 
of traffic.
226
 
 With freeway construction now stalled for five years, many had grown frustrated 
by continuing traffic problems in the city. Those in favor of the freeway aggressively 
pursued its completion and on May 8, 1975, Use Now I-10 Effectively (UNITE) began a 
petition to put the freeway back on the ballot on November 8. By July 2, they gathered 
15,204 signatures, almost double the amount required to get a proposal on the ballot. The 
ballot asked the public to vote for or against a depressed freeway in the Moreland 
Corridor, dropping the elevated design that sparked much of the controversy in the 
previous ballot.
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 A large portion of UNITE’s support came from residents on the western fringe of 
the city. They had to cross the Black Canyon Freeway, railroad tracks, and diagonal 
intersection across Grand Avenue to reach the rest of Phoenix; in some cases, it took an 
hour to reach the eastern part of the city. UNITE had $75,000 in campaign funds, which 
dwarfed the opposition’s funds. Part of the campaign included a series of advertisements 
that argued freeways could be beautiful and did not have to have a negative impact on the 
environment. For example, one ad showed a picture of the Los Altos Hills section of 
Interstate 280, Junipero Sera Freeway near San Francisco, blending into the surrounding 
tree covered hills. Another advertisement argued that a “Modern, streamlined Papago 
Freeway cannot be as ugly as the decaying Central and Moreland [Corridor].”228 
 Meanwhile, opposition to the freeway softened, as they lost two significant allies 
in the public battle. CMTAF’s status as a non-profit organization prevented it from 
receiving campaign funds and Eugene Pulliam, one of the staunchest freeway opponents, 
passed away in the summer of 1975. While most of the opposition lived in the center of 
the city, a survey found that 75% of registered voters opposed the construction of 
freeways in their areas, but residents often were ambivalent about freeways not planned 
in their backyard.
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 Other opposition came from those in the city who already experienced the impacts 
of freeways in their neighborhoods. Many South Phoenix residents’ experience with the 
Maricopa Freeway fostered negative opinions of urban freeways. Speaking on behalf of 
his community, South Phoenix Planning Committee Chairman Earl deBerge opposed the 
Inner Loop because it would divide neighborhoods, just like the Maricopa. Instead, he 
favored a parkway plan to “provide an aesthetically pleasing transportation system.” 
Kenneth Killian, a mayoral candidate from the area, made similar comments.
230
     
 At least six citizen groups advocated a “no” vote on the Papago. They represented 
8,600 homeowners along the freeway route, mostly concentrated near the Encanto 
neighborhood, but also in the western parts of the city where support for the freeway was 
also strongest. Without large campaign funds, they mostly relied on door-to-door 
advocacy. Better Urban Ideas for Land Development (BUILD) helped lead the campaign, 
with support of State Senator James Walsh, a former President of the Encanto Citizens 
Association. Like CMTAF in 1973, they argued for alternatives to the freeway because 
Phoenix “can’t worship any longer at the shrine of the automobile.” However, most 
politicians stayed clear of the divisive issue altogether. Few of the eight mayoral 
candidates or twenty-six city council candidates actively supported or opposed the 
freeway publicly.
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 On November 6, 1975, several factors---frustration with traffic congestion, the 
money already spent on clearing land for the downtown corridor, diminished opposition 
to the freeway in the papers, and the extensive pro-freeway campaign---worked in favor 
of the freeway. Voters approved the ballot initiative 54% to 46%. As a result, the freeway 
moved back into the Moreland Corridor. The Arizona Department of Transportation 
(ADOT) approved the plan, on the condition that the AHD “redesign, construct and 
appropriately landscape the improvements…in conformity with current environmental 
requirements, without helicoils and without excessively high spans between 7
th
 street and 
7
th
 avenue.” CMTAF and Encanto Citizens’ filed suit under section 134 of the Federal 
Highway Act, arguing the city did not include area-wide study of modes of transportation 
other than the automobile, and did not follow procedure concerning right-of-way 
purchases. The court ordered AHD to stop all right of way purchases in the Moreland 
Corridor until there were further studies and property assessments were redone. Mayor 
Barrow supported the Durango route and a parkway along the Moreland Corridor, but 
more than anything he wanted something done. In December 1975, Phoenix asked for 
another EIS from the Highway Department, this time for a depressed freeway, to get the 
project underway, finally.
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 In June 1976 the Highway Department finished a draft EIS and circulated copies 
for comment. Two public hearings over the next year elicited strong public response, 
with the final EIS containing over 300 pages of comments. These responses mostly 
echoed past sentiments about traffic congestion, air pollution, aesthetics, community 
unity, and public transit options. Many stated their preference for the Durango option to 
prevent a freeway from dividing the city and keeping air pollution out of the city. 
Phoenix in fact, already experienced difficulty meeting federal air quality standards for 
pollutants like carbon monoxide (especially in downtown), one of the toxic chemicals 
spewed from the exhaust pipes of vehicles.
233
 Republic columnist Ben Avery called the 
downtown freeway “shortsighted” and “foolish.” State Senator Joseph Shaughnessy Jr. 
stated, “It will be a great tragedy…if the unique atmosphere of Phoenix is buried beneath 
concrete freeways.” Many also expressed a desire for a parkway in the downtown 
corridor, “with bus lanes, bike and horse trails, trees, playgrounds, and small lakes.”234  
 Support for the downtown freeway, however, grew stronger in the western 
suburbs, with support also growing in other suburban areas to the north and east. Between 
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1969 and 1976, Maricopa County increased its population by 300,000, adding 150,000 
cars with it, much of it in the suburbs and “super-suburbs” of Tempe, Mesa, and 
Scottsdale. Commuters’ stressed city roads, which stressed commuters. Attorney John 
Burger spoke on behalf of a number of west side property owners who felt that a “high 
speed east-west carrier [was] vitally needed” because travel times across the city 
continued to increase.
235
  
 The MAG Regional Council recommended the downtown freeway option to 
ADOT, which selected the alternative on October 22, 1976. They cited the 1975 
referendum, MAG’s recommendation, and the clearance of the freeway corridor since the 
1960s in support of their decision. In 1977, UNITE circulated a report explaining that 
Phoenicians “adopted a spacious lifestyle,” and the city’s transportation problems 
threatened “to destroy the attractive way of life and economic well being of the 
community.”236 The city commissioned a public survey the same year to determine public 
opinion about urban growth issues. Respondents most frequently mentioned 
transportation issues as a factor they disliked about living in Phoenix. Moreover, two-
thirds of commuters perceived traffic congestion as a problem, especially in areas north 
and west of the city. Again, CMTAF challenged the Highway Department’s EIS based on 
the familiar concern of aesthetics, air pollution, community unity, and the lack of public 
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transit alternatives. The EPA expressed similar sentiments, and emphasized concern over 
increased air pollution in the downtown area, as Phoenix struggled to meet federal air 
quality standards.
237
 
 The final EIS report in 1978 acknowledged that the Moreland Corridor route 
“would have comparatively greater environmental impacts than most of the other 
alternatives,” but highlighted “significant overall advantages” for the downtown freeway 
“in terms of transportation service, corridor planning, and creation of a direct I-10 
connection.” In response to concern that the freeway would create more air pollution, the 
Highway Department explained the freeway would not add cars, but instead 
accommodate anticipated urban growth. A discussion of public transit was limited to an 
express bus lane on the freeway. The Federal Highway Administration and Department 
of Transportation approved the EIS on October 5, 1978, provided that the freeway be 
depressed, not interfere with archaeological sites, and environmental effects upon the city 
be minimized.
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 In 1979, the Encanto Citizens’ Association and other anti-freeway groups, led by 
Dr. Robert Hurt, made a final effort to prevent the freeway by gathering enough 
signatures to force a third ballot proposal, this time for a grid plan that called for the 
abandonment of all planned intercity freeways, replacing the Moreland Corridor route 
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with the Durango option. The plan also called for using federal freeway money to finance 
street improvements and establish an “efficient” bus service, a somewhat difficult and 
complicated process that would impose additional delays, but other cities had 
successfully done so. Despite strong public support for the Durango alignment, city and 
AHD felt it could not pursue it for various reasons. For one, it required a third time-
consuming EIS, and each month of delay added another $5 million to the costs of the 
freeway. Secondly, officials, most notably Phoenix Mayor Margaret Hance, argued the 
Durango route would not alleviate commuter traffic through the city.
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 Freeway opponents advanced familiar rhetoric used in 1975, arguing the freeway 
would increase the city’s air pollution and divide communities. A “yes” vote supported 
the grid plan, while a “no” vote supported the downtown freeway. Business leaders, 
developers, and labor unions opposed the grid plan, as did politicians who believed the 
elimination of 100 miles of planned freeways would condemn the city to more traffic 
congestion. One pamphlet insisted that “poor transportation will begin eating away the 
lifestyle we cherish in this Valley.” A MAG report urged the completion of the Papago 
“as rapidly as possible” since it was the building block of the planned freeway network, 
including the Squaw Peak freeway and an outer belt of suburban freeways.
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 On November 6, 1979, voters overwhelming favored the downtown freeway plan, 
73% to 27%. The freeway initiative actually drew more voters than the mayoral election 
that year, a sign of pent-up frustration and desire for a solution to traffic problems. For 
many, the freeway vote provided much needed relief. The city had widened and 
improved streets over the past decade, but struggled to keep pace with urban growth. 
Over the next four years, the state earmarked 70% of all interstate highway expenditures 
for the Papago Freeway ($457 million). However, it would take three more years before 
the AHD could meet all the conditions for final approval outlined by the Secretary of 
Transportation, including several years of archeological surveys. Construction of the 
West-Papago Inner Loop began in 1983.
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Coda: Freeways and the Future of Metropolitan Transportation in Phoenix  
 In 1973, the West Papago-Inner Loop represented everything that was bad about 
freeways at the time: it would cut a swath through one of the oldest neighborhoods in 
central Phoenix, create an eyesore in the city’s prized views, increase air pollution, and 
neglect the transportation needs of half the city’s population who did not have a car. Lou 
Lagomarsino, president of Johannessen and Girand, explained, “The defeat of the Papago 
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(in 1973) set transportation back more than anything else…When the people voted 
against it, the politicians retrenched.”242  
 By 1979, however, the public mood had changed drastically. Pro-freeway 
advocates successfully downplayed objections, scrapping the controversial elevated 
design in 1975. Moreover, continued traffic congestion became a greater priority, 
especially as freeway opponents failed to produce a visible, viable public transit 
alternative. Key opponents, such as Pulliam’s papers, faded as the decade progressed and 
with it widespread public opposition. Most believed the freeway was necessary to meet 
the needs of growth and maintain a low-density lifestyle. In the 1980s, the city unveiled a 
new freeway plan, with a tunnel replacing the Inner Loop, and a park above the freeway 
instead of below. Moreover, the city attempted to humanize the freeway: salvaged and 
replanted palm trees destroyed in the Moreland Corridor lined part of the downtown 
route; sandy-colored noise walls blended into the desert, pedestrian bridges over the 
freeway connected neighborhoods, and the freeway included a median where a light rail 
might eventually go. In 1990, 21 years after the first proposal for a downtown freeway, 
the AHD completed West Papago-Inner Loop.
243
  
 Despite efforts by the city and state to improve air quality through more emission 
controls, poor air quality persisted. In the 1980s, the city continually violated the 
maximum standard for carbon monoxide, almost entirely attributable to cars, and in 1984 
the city ranked worst in the nation (Phoenix violated the standard 99 times). Voters 
continually approved and extended sales taxes to fund highway expansion plans by MAG 
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because traffic congestion persisted; freeways became part of the cycle of road 
expansions begun in the 1950s, temporary solutions at best. Freeways eased traffic 
congestion at first, but they also facilitated additional growth in outlying areas and 
commuting that not long after exacerbated traffic congestion, which then led to more 
freeway construction. Through the 1990s, the Phoenix metro area ranked worst in air 
pollution than any western city except Los Angeles. In 2004, voters approved a 21-year 
extension of the sales tax for highway funding. Despite the continued growth of 
freeways, demand for mass transit grew as travel times and traffic continued to increase, 
as did concern over air pollution. Still, transportation plans since the 1980s have more 
seriously considered the value of public transit, even if implementing those visions has 
proven difficult.
244
  
 
Figure 10. Papago Freeway Votes: 1973, 1975, and 1979. The maps show the 
diminishing opposition (grey) for the Papago Freeway. Opposition to the freeway 
declined everywhere except the inner city near Encanto. After 1975, the northeastern 
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areas, such as Arcadia and Paradise Valley, came to support the freeway as traffic 
congestion increased in the city.
245
 
 
 All government transportation proposals for the Phoenix urban area since the final 
approval of the Papago included increased funding for buses, which expanded ridership 
each time. The first effort to create a mass transit system with a rail component occurred 
in 1989 with ValTrans, a countywide transportation plan that included 103-miles of rail. 
Voters rejected the plan, largely in opposition to a tax increase required to fund it. Voters 
in Phoenix, Scottsdale, and Chandler rejected separate transit taxes for light rail proposals 
in 1996 and 1997 as well. Opposition largely stemmed from a resistance to raise the sales 
tax by half a cent, a belief that light rail would not curb traffic congestion and would not 
receive enough use to justify its expense, and lastly that using taxes to fund mass transit 
diverted funds from necessary highway improvements. Moreover, the pro-mass transit 
campaigns lacked strong support from the business community, while just days before 
the election, Arizona Governor Fife Symington, ADOT, and the Arizona Department of 
Environmental Quality staged a press conference in opposition to the proposal.
246
  
 By 2000, the opposition to light rail in the city and Valley had begun to turn. 
Proposition 2000 asked voters to approve a $0.004 increase in the sales tax to fund a 
transportation plan that included 20 miles of light rail, in addition to expanding the bus 
system. Unlike efforts in the 1970s, the pro- light rail group had successful mass transit 
alternatives that they could point to. They pointed to successful light rails in places like 
San Diego and Dallas, as well studies that demonstrated people would ride the light rail if 
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built. Moreover, light rail projects in these cities and others demonstrated mass transit’s 
potential as an economic driver, spurring retail, commercial, and residential development 
in areas with rail stations. This brought support from business interests in the Valley. 
With large support from Valley businesses and corporations, the pro-transit campaign 
held over $1 million in their coffers, whereas the opposition group, De-Rail the Tax, did 
not even muster $10,000 in campaign funds. In an extensive TV advertisement campaign, 
the pro-Prop 2000 group argued the light rail would reduce traffic congestion, especially 
during rush hour, where the fictional “Dr. Gridlock” guided people out of cars on the 
freeway and into seats on a sleek, rapid rail system. Moreover, the pro-light rail group 
touted its benefits to city air quality. Lastly, the campaign explained to voters that the 
plan was eligible for significant federal funding that could provide up to half the costs of 
construction of the light rail. In March 2000, voters approved the tax by a margin of 
sixty-five percent to thirty-five percent.
247
 
 In 2004, a $15.8 billion MAG transit plan, funded by an extension of the 1985 
sales tax, reached the ballot. While the plan provided more than half its funds for 
highway improvement, $2.3 billion would go towards adding 27-miles of light rail to the 
2000 plan. Other funds would expand the bus system. Like the 2000 ballot proposal, the 
business community and Arizona politicians overwhelming supported Proposition 400. In 
addition, several former Phoenix Mayors, including John Driggs put their support behind 
the measure. Again, the pro-transit side outspent opposition groups, this time by a two-to-
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one ratio. Moreover, under the proposed plan, the federal government would pay half the 
bill. The plan created a combined light rail system serving Phoenix, Tempe, and Mesa, 
with the first link connecting Phoenix and Tempe in 2008. The level of use exceeded all 
expectations and in 2015 the line extended to downtown Mesa.
248
  
 The fight over West Papago-Inner Loop highlights many of the issues 
Phoenicians and metro area residents continue to consider, as the city grows in the 
twenty-first century. It demonstrated that support existed for mass transit, at least 
broadly, but in order to succeed any form of transportation needs strong public support, 
institutional support, and perhaps most importantly a system that reflects the values of the 
metropolitan area. These include low-density living, mobility and individual freedom, 
clean air and blue skies, and open space. The city approved the freeway, but altered its 
design and appearance. Decades later, the success of the first phase of the light rail 
system presents promise for public transit in the Valley and perhaps finally a turning 
point toward freeway alternatives once dismissed as incompatible with Phoenicians’ 
“western suburban” lifestyle.  
 Other western cities followed a similar postwar transportation trajectory, but like 
Phoenix, they too are beginning to implement mass transit alternatives. Denver, another 
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auto-centric, sprawling western city, is years ahead of Phoenix in terms of public transit. 
Its light rail connections spider in all directions across the South Platte River Valley, 
toward Boulder, Golden, and Aurora. While Denver’s downtown still boasts a large 
number of office buildings, the city has attempted to revitalize the area, turning an 
abandoned warehouse district into a pedestrian area with restaurants, shops, and parks 
affectionately known to locals as LoDo (lower downtown). Other old buildings in 
downtown were transformed into loft apartments. Furthermore, Houston, whose city 
boundaries cover over 600 square miles, built a light rail line to service the densest part 
of the city, and now the line has second highest average daily ridership in the nation. The 
city plans to expand the system in other dense areas of the city in coming years. 
Phoenicians would be wise to follow events in Denver and elsewhere, as it may provide a 
visible, viable example of how mass transit might connect a sprawling western 
metropolis, reduce air pollution from cars, and help revitalize a deteriorated downtown. 
Revitalization requires more than just building a light rail, but creating destinations that 
ensure ridership, things that reflect Phoenix’s values, as part of a larger metropolitan 
plan.
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CHAPTER 5: Environmentalism and Sustaining a Desert Metropolis 
 
 In 1963, Stewart Udall pointed out the divergence in America’s economic and 
environmental conditions. The nation stood “poised on a pinnacle of wealth and power,” 
he explained, “yet we live in a land of vanishing beauty, of increasing ugliness, of 
shrinking open space, and of an overall environment that is diminished daily by pollution 
and noise and blight.”250 Udall charged that American cities had been “growing too fast 
to grow well.”251 Few cities grew as rapidly as Phoenix.  
 Over the last half century, Phoenix grew into the fifth most populous city in the 
United States. Phoenix boosters’ promoted and fulfilled their vision of creating a modern 
desert metropolis, but found themselves challenged to meet the requirements of rapid, 
low-density development. The population boom that followed World War II resulted in 
inadequate infrastructure and environmental degradation, and citizen complaints and 
pressures to address these problems resulted in a debate over quality of life issues. 
Initially, city officials found themselves unprepared to address the problems and worked 
fastidiously to keep pace with growth, but more often than not policy solutions adapted to 
growth. Eventually, they became better at long-term thinking and comprehensive 
planning, which helped them anticipate growth and deal with some of its negative 
consequences. The three episodes examined demonstrate that urban growth is a dynamic 
and ongoing process where macroeconomic forces like federal policy and changing social 
values, such as quality of life concerns, intersect with the biophysical environment to 
affect policy decisions. 
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Looking Back: Postwar Growth and Environmentalism in Perspective  
 In his 1970 State of the Union Address, President Nixon explained, “The answer 
is not to abandon growth, but to redirect it” to ensure it is “compatible with the 
maintenance and improvement of our total environment.”252 Postwar environmental 
values, rooted in the specificity of local places, found avenues of expression in postwar 
planning as all levels of government sought to transform postwar values into policies that 
reflected visions of the future.
253
 Phoenix was no different. During the postwar period, 
government officials did more than ever before to incorporate environmental values into 
urban planning, setting important precedents and providing lessons for how to turn 
environmental values into effective policy. The professionalization of government 
planning following World War II, guided by the Charter Government’s ethos of 
managerial efficiency, allowed Phoenix officials to not only catch up with growth, but 
eventual create policies that anticipated growth. 
 I argue that three dynamic factors influenced the extent to which environmental 
values were incorporated into urban growth policy. Federal policies provided crucial 
dollars and legal precedents that guided Phoenix’s policy solutions dealing with the 
consequences of growth, but solutions also had to have public support---grassroots 
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advocacy as well as electoral support for bond measures---and last the solutions had to 
congeal with the suburban characteristics and values that defined Phoenix.  
 Each of the three episodes went through a similar policy process that reflects the 
evolving undercurrents of urban growth policy in postwar Phoenix. First, the unintended 
consequences rapid urban growth and relatively lax county regulations led to public 
concern and pressure on government officials to redress externalities like the destruction 
of recreation space, and better incorporate quality of life issues into urban planning. The 
successful efforts of the PCMF and the less successful campaign waged by anti-freeway 
groups provide lessons in grassroots activism.  Initially, policy decisions sought to keep 
pace with growth, by extending municipal sewers to outlying areas, trying to purchase or 
trade other land for privately held land Camelback Mountain, or expanding city streets to 
meet the growing number of people and their cars in the valley. Eventually, after citizen 
lobbying and with the assistance of federal dollars through programs like the Land and 
Water Conservation Fund, the city created a centralized sewage treatment facility, 
preserved an important recreation area, and constructed of a network of freeways. While 
these anticipated and planned for growth, they also promoted more growth, which led to 
new unintended consequences and challenges. In this way, urban growth policy is an 
ongoing process, where each challenge, as exemplified by the three episodes in the 
postwar period, offers an opportunity to incorporate new values and concerns into policy 
decisions. 
 The debate over the West Papago-Inner Loop serves as a microcosm for the 
nuanced way in which the dynamic forces of growth interacted with the factors critical to 
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incorporating environmental values into postwar urban growth policy. Clear and 
differentiated policy choices existed to meet the transportation requirements of the 
growing city, but macroeconomic factors like federal funding and a desire by city 
officials and the public to continue pursuing a path of low-density development defeated 
the mass transit option. Moreover, it demonstrates how past policy decisions influence 
later ones, as policies predicated on the assumption of freeway construction created 
institutional inertia that grassroots activists could not overcome. Yet the continued traffic 
congestion and the ongoing cycle of need and fulfillment in freeway construction, 
continuing air pollution problems, increased public support for mass transit alternatives, 
and the availability of federal funding for mass transit have created a new context for 
transportation policy. Forty years later, city officials and the public are reconsidering 
whether freeways are the best option to meet transportation needs, as the city plans to 
continue expanding the light rail system that opened in 2004. Transportation policy, like 
other urban growth decisions, is part of a reciprocal process; a dialogue between city 
officials, the public, and various experts, that seeks to balance the status quo with visions 
of the future.  The challenges of the twenty first century, such as climate change, will 
provide more opportunities to chart a new course for the city. 
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Figure 11. Reg Manning’s Cartoon “The Long-long on Ramp.” Reg Manning’s cartoon 
depicts the long-delays and frustrations with the Papago Freeway.
254
 
 
 
Looking Forward: History Carries Weight in Policymaking  
 
 Contemporary policy discussions “are infused with institutional memories of past 
events and nuanced with expectations for the future.” 255 These policy decisions shaped 
the urban character of contemporary Phoenix by setting it on a policy trajectory that has 
been slow to change. Between 1980 and 2010, the population of the city grew from 
789,704 to 1,445,632 and sprawls over 500 square miles.
256
 Despite infill programs and 
strategies aimed at directing growth in particular corridors, growth in outlying areas 
continued to outpace urban core development. Like many cities, Phoenix has continued to 
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sprawl.
257
 Moreover, the city continues to attract migrants; one-quarter of Phoenix 
residents in 2000 had arrived from outside the urban area within the past five years.
258
 
Rapid growth continues to present challenges and opportunities. City officials and the 
public can draw on previous experiences to guide contemporary decisions: the 
importance of anticipatory planning, the role of citizen groups to raise awareness of 
issues and pressure city leaders to solve problems, and the importance of environmental 
factors to quality of life and a successful urban design. 
 Debates over how and where the city grows remains a central topic in newspapers 
and among experts in policy reports. For example, the Morrison Institute of Public Policy 
at Arizona State University has advocated for policies that encourage higher density 
development to cope with projected growth in the twenty-first century. Critiques of the 
city’s growth policies, like Andrew Ross’ Bird on Fire, which declared Phoenix the 
“least sustainable city in the world,” are often framed through a sustainability lens and a 
concern over depleting resources and climate change. The latter remains the one of the 
greatest challenges of the twenty-first century.
259
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 Central Arizona’s environment---the hot, dry, nearly always sunny desert 
surrounded by mountains---helped attract millions to the valley and exacerbated growth 
challenges, but also offers an opportunity for adaptive solutions. No asset in the Phoenix 
urban area is more abundant than sunshine and the Greater Phoenix has some of the 
highest solar energy potential in the nation.
260
 The need to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from electricity generated by fossil fuel-fired power plants presents a 
tremendous challenge but also an opportunity for the public, non-governmental 
organizations, utilities and other businesses, and public officials to forge new 
partnerships for innovative solutions that harness the valley’s solar potential. Government 
officials, utilities and businesses will have to plan and prepare for a future where the 
majority of the city’s energy needs are met not by fossil fuels, but by cleaner forms of 
energy, sources like solar. The public will play a critical role in pressuring elected 
officials, who have largely been apathetic in dealing with climate change, to take action. 
Macroeconomic forces have driven down the costs of producing solar panels, as well as 
EPA regulations requiring states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions from power 
plants may make policies favorable to solar more attractive. 
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 Climate change’s effects are projected to be particularly challenging for the 
Southwest, where water supplies are already stretched beyond their limits.
261
 Phoenix and 
other valley cities reuse nearly all their wastewater, with significant amounts of effluent 
going toward cooling the reactors at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant and the fields of 
valley farmers. Wastewater though, represents a small slice of the much larger picture of 
water use in the valley. Projections of regional supply and demand show that in the 
coming decades, new acquisitions and better conservation of water, as well as the 
construction of new infrastructure to manage the region’s water supply are required to 
sustain Phoenix.
262
 New acquisitions of water seem a dubious and naïve strategy given 
that the Colorado River is already overallocated. Conservation as a strategy permits 
continued growth, as one person’s recycled water often goes to a new home elsewhere. 
Moreover, growth predicated on conservation makes communities’ with a finite water 
source, like Phoenix, more vulnerable, for when they finally reach the last drop of water, 
they have less flexibility because the only thing left to cut back on are the essentials. Still, 
conservation does provide a buffer before the last drop of water is reached. Climate 
change will lead to longer, more frequent and intense droughts in the American 
Southwest to which city officials will have to adapt. At some point, the water supply will 
no longer support growth. In the not-so-distant future, the city will likely sit at the 
negotiating table with a host of thirsty cities and states from the Colorado River 
watershed, as well as agricultural and energy interests. City and state officials will have 
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difficult decisions to make about who gets water and who does not, and perhaps place 
restrictions on urban growth.
263
  
 Sustainable growth policies should seek to make the built environment reflect and 
complement a places’ natural environment. The Valley floor continues to fill with urban 
development that turns natural areas into subdivisions, shopping malls, and other facets 
of modern American suburban living. Phoenix and Maricopa County however, have 
worked to protect the unique ecology of the Valley. In the late 1990s, Phoenix 
collaborated with conservation and civic groups to establish the Sonoran Desert Preserve 
in the northern part of the city.
264
 The prevention of urban development in the desert 
abets summer heat in the metropolitan area by replacing heat-retaining pavement with 
natural landscape, while utilizing natural water-conserving desert flora instead of water 
intensive lawns. Moreover, the valley residents can enjoy hiking and mountain biking 
trails, as well as camping, in addition to the aesthetics of the desert. Conservation and 
other civic-minded groups need to continue to pressure city leaders to not only remedy 
the unintended consequences of growth, but to pursue policies that plan ahead to maintain 
and improve the quality of life in the valley, including environmental amenities.
265
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 Public and business support for freeway alternatives, as well as federal funds to 
offset construction costs made CMTAF leader Gerald Judd’s dream come true, although 
forty years later. While freeways remain the dominant form of transit in the Phoenix 
urban area, in 2008 a light rail line opened, connecting downtown Tempe to Phoenix. The 
Phoenix City Council recently approved a $30 billion transportation plan that includes 
funds for 30-miles of new light rail. It currently awaits public approval.
266
 City officials 
and the public must continue to discuss what kind of urban area they desire and pursue 
policy solutions to make visions a reality. As the city grows, it will need to make room 
for more people, either in the existing urban area or by expanding urban boundaries 
further into the desert. Mass transit complements denser and mixed-land use, where 
residents can walk or bike from their homes, shop, get a bite to eat. Cities like San Diego 
and Dallas, as well as Houston and Denver have already shown that public transit can not 
only work in sprawling cities, but also add to residents’ quality of life and stimulate the 
economy, something difficult to put a price tag on. Moreover, public transit limits air 
pollutant emissions from cars, the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in Phoenix. 
According to a federal study based on nationally averages, light rail systems produce 
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 The plan includes more than $5 billion invested in development along the Phoenix light-rail corridor, 
with $3.6 billion of private investment. See Brenna Goth, “Phoenix council to weigh $30 billion 
transportation plan,” Arizona Republic 2 March 2015, 
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62% less greenhouse gas emissions than automobiles.
267
 Moreover, public transit 
connects downtown destinations throughout Valley communities.
268
  
 While the Phoenix metropolitan area grew rapidly through the latter half of the 
twentieth century, in the twenty-first century, a broader picture emerges. Phoenix, along 
with Tucson, forms the central core of the “Sun Corridor,” a potential megapolitan region 
stretching from Nogales on the Mexican border to Prescott in the middle of Yavapai 
County; it contains 20% of the state’s land but 80% of its population.  In 2010, it held a 
population of 5.73 million; by 2040, that number is projected to balloon to 9 to 10 
million.
269
 Economic, social, and cultural interconnections define the Sun Corridor and 
other megapolitan regions like New York-Philadelphia and Southern California. The 
growth of these regions offers both challenges as well as opportunities for creative 
solutions. Furthermore, environmental challenges are increasingly national or global in 
scale, which makes it difficult for municipalities to effectively deal with issues like 
climate change singularly. Municipal, county, and state leaders would be wise to consider 
policy actions on a wider scale, much as municipal officials after World War II 
increasingly collaborated at the county level to ameliorate unintended environmental 
                                                          
267
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consequences of growth. Moreover, municipal officials pursued more comprehensive 
planning that incorporated new quality of life values into urban planning, such as the 
inclusion of open spaces. Yet, challenges persist. No policy can forecast the future, nor 
predict, much less control how social values will change or what macroeconomic factors 
might influence urban growth, and so the process continues through cycles of challenges 
and responses; each decision reverberates into future debates and decisions.   
 
Figure 12. Map of the “Sun Corridor.”270 
 In 1945, few outside of city boosters might have predicted the transformation of 
Phoenix from a small desert city into the fifth largest city in the nation. It was a 
mammoth and coordinated undertaking to promote the growth of the city while 
attempting to maintain an attractive quality of life, including environmental conditions. 
                                                          
270
 Ibid, 25.  
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The challenges currently facing Phoenix require the same enthusiasm and effort, albeit 
toward different ends if the city plans to sustain itself and a desirable quality of life for its 
residents. Just as decisions fifty years ago helped create modern Phoenix, contemporary 
decisions will shape the city’s future. The question remains: to what end goal? Perhaps, 
sixty years removed from the end of World War II and the beginning of contemporary 
Phoenix, it is time to reflect on what values will guide the city’s development over the 
next sixty years. On December 17, 1945, the front-page headline of the Arizona Republic 
exclaimed, “Planning Holds Key to City Future.” It remains as true today as it did then.  
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